linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 4/4] KVM: x86: Expose Architectural LBR CPUID and its XSAVES bit

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Message-ID: <219d869b-0eeb-9e52-ea99-3444c6ab16a3@intel.com>
Date:   Thu, 4 Feb 2021 08:59:36 +0800
From:   "Xu, Like" <like.xu@...el.com>
To:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc:     Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Like Xu <like.xu@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/4] KVM: x86: Expose Architectural LBR CPUID and its
 XSAVES bit

On 2021/2/3 22:37, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 03/02/21 14:57, Like Xu wrote:
>> If CPUID.(EAX=07H, ECX=0):EDX[19] is exposed to 1, the KVM supports Arch
>> LBRs and CPUID leaf 01CH indicates details of the Arch LBRs capabilities.
>> As the first step, KVM only exposes the current LBR depth on the host for
>> guest, which is likely to be the maximum supported value on the host.
>>
>> If KVM supports XSAVES, the CPUID.(EAX=0DH, ECX=1):EDX:ECX[bit 15]
>> is also exposed to 1, which means the availability of support for Arch
>> LBR configuration state save and restore. When available, guest software
>> operating at CPL=0 can use XSAVES/XRSTORS manage supervisor state
>> component Arch LBR for own purposes once IA32_XSS [bit 15] is set.
>> XSAVE support for Arch LBRs is enumerated in CPUID.(EAX=0DH, ECX=0FH).
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@...ux.intel.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c   | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
>>   arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c |  2 ++
>>   arch/x86/kvm/x86.c     | 10 +++++++++-
>>   3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
>> index 944f518ca91b..900149eec42d 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
>> @@ -778,6 +778,29 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct 
>> kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
>>               entry->edx = 0;
>>           }
>>           break;
>> +    /* Architectural LBR */
>> +    case 0x1c:
>> +    {
>> +        u64 lbr_depth_mask = 0;
>> +
>> +        if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR)) {
>> +            entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
>> +            break;
>> +        }
>> +
>> +        /*
>> +         * KVM only exposes the maximum supported depth,
>> +         * which is also the fixed value used on the host.
>> +         *
>> +         * KVM doesn't allow VMM user sapce to adjust depth
>> +         * per guest, because the guest LBR emulation depends
>> +         * on the implementation of the host LBR driver.
>> +         */
>> +        lbr_depth_mask = 1UL << fls(entry->eax & 0xff);
>> +        entry->eax &= ~0xff;
>> +        entry->eax |= lbr_depth_mask;
>> +        break;
>> +    }
>>       /* Intel PT */
>>       case 0x14:
>>           if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT)) {
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> index 9ddf0a14d75c..c22175d9564e 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> @@ -7498,6 +7498,8 @@ static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void)
>>           kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID);
>>       if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest())
>>           kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT);
>> +    if (cpu_has_vmx_arch_lbr())
>> +        kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR);
>>         if (vmx_umip_emulated())
>>           kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_UMIP);
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>> index 667d0042d0b7..107f2e72f526 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>> @@ -10385,8 +10385,16 @@ int kvm_arch_hardware_setup(void *opaque)
>>         if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
>>           supported_xss = 0;
>> -    else
>> +    else {
>>           supported_xss &= host_xss;
>> +        /*
>> +         * The host doesn't always set ARCH_LBR bit to hoss_xss since this
>> +         * Arch_LBR component is used on demand in the Arch LBR driver.
>> +         * Check e649b3f0188f "Support dynamic supervisor feature for 
>> LBR".
>> +         */
>> +        if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR))
>> +            supported_xss |= XFEATURE_MASK_LBR;
>> +    }
>>         /* Update CET features now that supported_xss is finalized. */
>>       if (!kvm_cet_supported()) {
>>
>
> This requires some of the XSS patches that Weijang posted for CET, right?

Yes, at least we need three of them for Arch LBR:

3009dfd6d61f KVM: x86: Load guest fpu state when accessing MSRs managed by 
XSAVES
d39b0a16ad1f KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on writes to MSR_IA32_XSS
e98bf65e51c9 KVM: x86: Report XSS as an MSR to be saved if there are 
supported features

>
> Also, who takes care of saving/restoring the MSRs, if the host has not 
> added XFEATURE_MASK_LBR to MSR_IA32_XSS?

I may not understand your concern on this. Let me try to explain:

The guest Arch LBR driver will save the origin host_xss and
mark the LBR bit only in the XSS and then save/restore MSRs
in the extra specified guest memory, and restore the origin host_xss.

On the host side, the same thing happens to vcpu thread
due to the help of guest LBR event created by the vPMU
and the hardware LBR MSRs are saved/restored in a exclusive way.

>
> Thanks,
>
> Paolo
>