linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 4/4] KVM: x86: Expose Architectural LBR CPUID and its XSAVES bit

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Message-ID: <8321d54b-173b-722b-ddce-df2f9bd7abc4@redhat.com>
Date:   Wed, 3 Feb 2021 15:37:28 +0100
From:   Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To:     Like Xu <like.xu@...ux.intel.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc:     Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/4] KVM: x86: Expose Architectural LBR CPUID and its
 XSAVES bit

On 03/02/21 14:57, Like Xu wrote:
> If CPUID.(EAX=07H, ECX=0):EDX[19] is exposed to 1, the KVM supports Arch
> LBRs and CPUID leaf 01CH indicates details of the Arch LBRs capabilities.
> As the first step, KVM only exposes the current LBR depth on the host for
> guest, which is likely to be the maximum supported value on the host.
> 
> If KVM supports XSAVES, the CPUID.(EAX=0DH, ECX=1):EDX:ECX[bit 15]
> is also exposed to 1, which means the availability of support for Arch
> LBR configuration state save and restore. When available, guest software
> operating at CPL=0 can use XSAVES/XRSTORS manage supervisor state
> component Arch LBR for own purposes once IA32_XSS [bit 15] is set.
> XSAVE support for Arch LBRs is enumerated in CPUID.(EAX=0DH, ECX=0FH).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@...ux.intel.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c   | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
>   arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c |  2 ++
>   arch/x86/kvm/x86.c     | 10 +++++++++-
>   3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> index 944f518ca91b..900149eec42d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> @@ -778,6 +778,29 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
>   			entry->edx = 0;
>   		}
>   		break;
> +	/* Architectural LBR */
> +	case 0x1c:
> +	{
> +		u64 lbr_depth_mask = 0;
> +
> +		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR)) {
> +			entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
> +			break;
> +		}
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * KVM only exposes the maximum supported depth,
> +		 * which is also the fixed value used on the host.
> +		 *
> +		 * KVM doesn't allow VMM user sapce to adjust depth
> +		 * per guest, because the guest LBR emulation depends
> +		 * on the implementation of the host LBR driver.
> +		 */
> +		lbr_depth_mask = 1UL << fls(entry->eax & 0xff);
> +		entry->eax &= ~0xff;
> +		entry->eax |= lbr_depth_mask;
> +		break;
> +	}
>   	/* Intel PT */
>   	case 0x14:
>   		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT)) {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 9ddf0a14d75c..c22175d9564e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -7498,6 +7498,8 @@ static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void)
>   		kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID);
>   	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest())
>   		kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT);
> +	if (cpu_has_vmx_arch_lbr())
> +		kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR);
>   
>   	if (vmx_umip_emulated())
>   		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_UMIP);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 667d0042d0b7..107f2e72f526 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -10385,8 +10385,16 @@ int kvm_arch_hardware_setup(void *opaque)
>   
>   	if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
>   		supported_xss = 0;
> -	else
> +	else {
>   		supported_xss &= host_xss;
> +		/*
> +		 * The host doesn't always set ARCH_LBR bit to hoss_xss since this
> +		 * Arch_LBR component is used on demand in the Arch LBR driver.
> +		 * Check e649b3f0188f "Support dynamic supervisor feature for LBR".
> +		 */
> +		if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR))
> +			supported_xss |= XFEATURE_MASK_LBR;
> +	}
>   
>   	/* Update CET features now that supported_xss is finalized. */
>   	if (!kvm_cet_supported()) {
> 

This requires some of the XSS patches that Weijang posted for CET, right?

Also, who takes care of saving/restoring the MSRs, if the host has not 
added XFEATURE_MASK_LBR to MSR_IA32_XSS?

Thanks,

Paolo