linux-kernel - Re: [PATCHv2 0/4] perf/core: Add support to exclude kernel mode PMU tracing

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Date:   Thu, 04 Mar 2021 11:59:05 -0800
From:   Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Sai Prakash Ranjan <saiprakash.ranjan@...eaurora.org>
Cc:     Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@...aro.org>,
        Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>,
        Mike Leach <mike.leach@...aro.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
        Leo Yan <leo.yan@...aro.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>,
        Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>, coresight@...ts.linaro.org,
        Stephen Boyd <swboyd@...omium.org>,
        Denis Nikitin <denik@...omium.org>,
        Mattias Nissler <mnissler@...omium.org>,
        Al Grant <al.grant@....com>, linux-arm-msm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        Douglas Anderson <dianders@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv2 0/4] perf/core: Add support to exclude kernel mode PMU tracing

Sai Prakash Ranjan <saiprakash.ranjan@...eaurora.org> writes:
>
> "Consider a system where disk contents are encrypted and the encryption
> key is set up by the user when mounting the file system. From that point
> on the encryption key resides in the kernel. It seems reasonable to
> expect that the disk encryption key be protected from exfiltration even
> if the system later suffers a root compromise (or even against insiders
> that have root access), at least as long as the attacker doesn't
> manage to compromise the kernel."

Normally disk encryption is in specialized work queues. It's total
overkill to restrict all of the kernel if you just want to restrict
those work queues.

I would suggest some more analysis where secrets are actually stored
and handled first.

-Andi