linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v23 00/28] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack

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Date:   Wed, 17 Mar 2021 10:18:00 +0100
From:   Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To:     "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Cc:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, x86@...nel.org,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
        Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
        Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
        Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>,
        Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v23 00/28] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack


* Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> wrote:

> On 3/16/2021 2:15 PM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 08:10:26AM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > > Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is a new Intel processor feature that blocks
> > > return/jump-oriented programming attacks.  Details are in "Intel 64 and
> > > IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual" [1].
> > > 
> > > CET can protect applications and the kernel.  This series enables only
> > > application-level protection, and has three parts:
> > > 
> > >    - Shadow stack [2],
> > >    - Indirect branch tracking [3], and
> > >    - Selftests [4].
> > 
> > CET is marketing; afaict SS and IBT are 100% independent and there's no
> > reason what so ever to have them share any code, let alone a Kconfig
> > knob.
> 
> We used to have shadow stack and ibt under separate Kconfig options, but in
> a few places they actually share same code path, such as the XSAVES
> supervisor states and ELF header for example.  Anyways I will be happy to
> make changes again if there is agreement.

I was look at:

  x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states

didn't see any IBT logic - it's essentially all shadow stack state.

Which is not surprising, forward call edge integrity protection (IBT) 
requires very little state, does it?

With IBT there's no nesting, no stack - the IBT state machine 
basically requires the next instruction to be and ENDBR instruction, 
and that's essentially it, right?

Thanks,

	Ingo