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Message-ID: <27d7d3fa-5df8-1880-df21-200de31cc629@pengutronix.de>
Date:   Thu, 1 Apr 2021 12:28:08 +0200
From:   Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>
To:     Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
Cc:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        horia geanta <horia.geanta@....com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        aymen sghaier <aymen.sghaier@....com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        davem <davem@...emloft.net>,
        James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        kernel <kernel@...gutronix.de>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Steffen Trumtrar <s.trumtrar@...gutronix.de>,
        Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@....com>,
        Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>,
        david <david@...ma-star.at>,
        Franck Lenormand <franck.lenormand@....com>,
        Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>,
        linux-integrity <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list, ASYMMETRIC KEYS" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP
 CAAM-based trusted keys

Hello,

On 01.04.21 12:20, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> Ahmad,
> 
> ----- Ursprüngliche Mail -----
>> Von: "Ahmad Fatoum" <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>
>>> I'm pretty sure with minimal changes it will work with your recent approach too.
>>
>> I am using dmsetup directly in my project. I am not familiar with cryptsetup
>> plain. What benefits do you see with this over direct dmsetup?
> 
> cryptsetup is the de-facto standard to setup encrypted block devices.
> There is a lot of existing tooling around cryptsetup already (systemd, etc..),

Do you mean systemd-cryptsetup? It looks to me like it's just a way to supply
the keyphrase. With trusted keys and a keyphrase unknown to userspace, this
won't work.

> so being able to use CAAM keys for dm-crypt with cryptsetup seems natural to me.
> Plain mode allows setting up dm-crypt without LUKS.

I don't (yet) see the utility of it without LUKS. Perhaps a command dump on how
to do the same I did with dmsetup, but with cryptsetup plain instead could
help me to see the benefits?

Cheers,
Ahmad

> 
> Thanks,
> //richard
> 

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