linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v1 0/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys

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Date:   Thu, 1 Apr 2021 18:25:03 +0530
From:   Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
To:     Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@...il.com>
Cc:     Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@....com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@....com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>, kernel@...gutronix.de,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Steffen Trumtrar <s.trumtrar@...gutronix.de>,
        Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@....com>,
        Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>,
        David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>,
        Franck LENORMAND <franck.lenormand@....com>,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        "open list:ASYMMETRIC KEYS" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP
 CAAM-based trusted keys

Hi Richard,

On Wed, 31 Mar 2021 at 03:34, Richard Weinberger
<richard.weinberger@...il.com> wrote:
>
> Ahmad,
>
> On Wed, Mar 17, 2021 at 3:08 PM Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de> wrote:
> >     keyctl add trusted $KEYNAME "load $(cat ~/kmk.blob)" @s
>
> Is there a reason why we can't pass the desired backend name in the
> trusted key parameters?
> e.g.
> keyctl add trusted $KEYNAME "backendtype caam load $(cat ~/kmk.blob)" @s
>

IIUC, this would require support for multiple trusted keys backends at
runtime but currently the trusted keys subsystem only supports a
single backend which is selected via kernel module parameter during
boot.

So the trusted keys framework needs to evolve to support multiple
trust sources at runtime but I would like to understand the use-cases
first. IMO, selecting the best trust source available on a platform
for trusted keys should be a one time operation, so why do we need to
have other backends available at runtime as well?

-Sumit

> --
> Thanks,
> //richard