linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v1 0/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys

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Message-ID: <1465227062.139734.1617275814134.JavaMail.zimbra@nod.at>
Date:   Thu, 1 Apr 2021 13:16:54 +0200 (CEST)
From:   Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
To:     Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>
Cc:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        horia geanta <horia.geanta@....com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        aymen sghaier <aymen.sghaier@....com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        davem <davem@...emloft.net>,
        James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        kernel <kernel@...gutronix.de>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Steffen Trumtrar <s.trumtrar@...gutronix.de>,
        Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@....com>,
        Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>,
        david <david@...ma-star.at>,
        Franck Lenormand <franck.lenormand@....com>,
        Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>,
        linux-integrity <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list, ASYMMETRIC KEYS" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP
 CAAM-based trusted keys

Ahmad,

----- Ursprüngliche Mail -----
> Von: "Ahmad Fatoum" <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>
>> But using LUKS would mean that cryptsetup has access to the plain disc
>> encryption key material?
>> This would be a no-go for many systems out there, key material must not
>> accessible to userspace.
>> I know, distrusting userspace root is not easy, but doable. :)
> 
> The LUKS2 format supports tokens. I see no reason why the encrypted blob
> couldn't be stored there along with the usual metadata. cryptsetup would
> then load it as kernel trusted key and use it for dmcrypt decryption.
> 
> This will mean we have to part ways with features such as having multiple
> keys, but I think it's worth it to have a plug and play solution for
> trusted keys.

Ah, now I can follow your thoughts!
Yes, that would be nice to have. :)

I kind of assumed you want to use LUKS with passphrases and CAAM blobs.

Thanks,
//richard