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Message-ID: <cc3c108d-cbf5-0792-5aa4-8783ed4a11dc@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2021 14:39:47 -0700
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
"zohar@...ux.ibm.com" <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
"jmorris@...ei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"paul@...l-moore.com" <paul@...l-moore.com>
Cc: "linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"selinux@...r.kernel.org" <selinux@...r.kernel.org>,
"reiserfs-devel@...r.kernel.org" <reiserfs-devel@...r.kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] security: Pass xattrs allocated by LSMs to the
inode_init_security hook
On 4/22/2021 9:12 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
>> From: Casey Schaufler [mailto:casey@...aufler-ca.com]
>> Sent: Thursday, April 22, 2021 5:46 PM
>> On 4/22/2021 6:46 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
>>>> From: Casey Schaufler [mailto:casey@...aufler-ca.com]
>>>> Sent: Thursday, April 22, 2021 12:44 AM
>>>> On 4/21/2021 9:19 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
>>>>> In preparation for moving EVM to the LSM infrastructure, this patch
>>>>> replaces the name, value, len triple with the xattr array pointer provided
>>>>> by security_inode_init_security(). LSMs are expected to call the new
>>>>> function lsm_find_xattr_slot() to find the first unused slot of the
array
>>>>> where the xattr should be written.
>>>>>
>>>>> This patch modifies also SELinux and Smack to search for an unused slot, to
>>>>> have a consistent behavior across LSMs (the unmodified version would
>>>>> overwrite the xattr set by the first LSM in the chain). It is also
>>>>> desirable to have the modification in those LSMs, as they are likely used
>>>>> as a reference for the development of new LSMs.
>>>> This looks better than V1. One safety comment below.
>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 4 ++--
>>>>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 18 +++++++++++++++---
>>>>> security/security.c | 13 +++++++------
>>>>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 ++++++-------
>>>>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 20 +++++++++-----------
>>>>> 5 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
>> b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
>>>>> index 477a597db013..afb9dd122f60 100644
>>>>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
>>>>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
>>>>> @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_notify, const struct path
>>>> *path, u64 mask,
>>>>> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_alloc_security, struct inode *inode)
>>>>> LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_free_security, struct inode
>> *inode)
>>>>> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security, struct inode *inode,
>>>>> - struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
>>>>> - void **value, size_t *len)
>>>>> + struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs,
>>>>> + void *fs_data)
>>>>> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security_anon, struct inode *inode,
>>>>> const struct qstr *name, const struct inode *context_inode)
>>>>> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_create, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>>>>> index c5498f5174ce..e8c9bac29b9d 100644
>>>>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>>>>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>>>>> @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
>>>>>
>>>>> #include <linux/security.h>
>>>>> #include <linux/init.h>
>>>>> +#include <linux/xattr.h>
>>>>> #include <linux/rculist.h>
>>>>>
>>>>> /**
>>>>> @@ -227,9 +228,11 @@
>>>>> * @inode contains the inode structure of the newly created inode.
>>>>> * @dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory.
>>>>> * @qstr contains the last path component of the new object
>>>>> - * @name will be set to the allocated name suffix (e.g. selinux).
>>>>> - * @value will be set to the allocated attribute value.
>>>>> - * @len will be set to the length of the value.
>>>>> + * @xattrs contains the full array of xattrs allocated by LSMs where
>>>>> + * ->name will be set to the allocated name suffix (e.g. selinux).
>>>>> + * ->value will be set to the allocated attribute value.
>>>>> + * ->len will be set to the length of the value.
>>>>> + * @fs_data contains filesystem-specific data.
>>>>> * Returns 0 if @name and @value have been successfully set,
>>>>> * -EOPNOTSUPP if no security attribute is needed, or
>>>>> * -ENOMEM on memory allocation failure.
>>>>> @@ -1661,4 +1664,13 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct
>>>> security_hook_list *hooks,
>>>>> extern int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
>>>>>
>>>> Some "security researcher" with a fuzz tester is going to manage to dump
>> junk
>>>> into the slots and ruin your week. I suggest a simple change to make
bounds
>>>> checking
>>>> possible. It should never happen, but if that was sufficient people would
>>>> love C
>>>> string processing better.
>>>>
>>>>> +static inline struct xattr *lsm_find_xattr_slot(struct xattr *xattrs)
>>>> +static inline struct xattr *lsm_find_xattr_slot(struct xattr *xattrs,
>> int available)
>>> Ok. I looked at how I should do that. Initially, I thought that I could
>>> use a global variable storing the number of inode_init_security
>>> implementations, determined at LSM registration time. Then,
>>> I realized that this would not work, as the number of array elements
>>> when security_old_inode_init_security() is called is 1.
>> You can address that by expanding the call_int_hook MACRO in
>> security_old_inode_init_security() in place and change it to stop
>> after the first call. The two callers of security_old_inode_init_security()
>> are going to need to be converted to security_inode_init_security()
>> when the "complete" stacking (i.e. SELinux + Smack) anyway, so I don't
>> see that as an issue.
> The current version already does it. I was more concerned about LSMs
> requesting more than one slot. In this case, lsm_find_xattr_slot()
> could return a slot outside the array, unless we pass the correct size.
That would be a bit of a problem. It would be possible to add the number
of inode_init "slots" to struct lsm_info or to struct lsm_blob_sizes.
That would require dynamic allocation, but you've been advocating
that anyway. Ding! If we add the number of slots required to lsm_blob_sizes
we can replace that with the slot number to use in the inode_init_security
array. This is the same technique used for blob offsets in the LSM managed
blobs. The EVM hook will know the size of the array. We pass the base of
array to the module inode_init_security hooks, and they know what slot(s)
they've been told to use. The EVM hook starts with base and any slot that's
filled get processed.
Unfortunately, security_old_inode_init_security() will have to allocate
the array and copy results from the right slot into the parameters passed.
Essentially a complete rewrite.
>
> If we convert ocfs2 and reiserfs to use security_inode_init_security(),
> we could use the global variable set at LSM registration time, and we
> don't need to add a new parameter.
>
> Roberto
>
> HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
> Managing Director: Li Peng, Li Jian, Shi Yanli
>
>> Is anyone concerned that ocfs2 and reiserfs aren't EVM capable?
>>
>>> I modified the patch set to pass also the number of array elements.
>>>
>>> Roberto
>>>
>>> HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
>>> Managing Director: Li Peng, Li Jian, Shi Yanli
>>>
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + struct xattr *slot;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + for (slot = xattrs; slot && slot->name != NULL; slot++)
>>>> + for (slot = xattrs; slot && slot->name != NULL; slot++)
>>>> if (WARN_ON(slot > xattrs[available]))
>>>> return NULL;
>>>>
>>>>> + ;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + return slot;
>>>>> +}
>>>>> #endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
>>>>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>>>>> index 7f14e59c4f8e..2c1fe1496069 100644
>>>>> --- a/security/security.c
>>>>> +++ b/security/security.c
>>>>> @@ -1037,18 +1037,16 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode
>>>> *inode, struct inode *dir,
>>>>> if (!initxattrs)
>>>>> return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP,
>>>> inode,
>>>>> - dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL);
>>>>> + dir, qstr, NULL, fs_data);
>>>>> memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs));
>>>>> lsm_xattr = new_xattrs;
>>>>> ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir,
>> qstr,
>>>>> - &lsm_xattr->name,
>>>>> - &lsm_xattr->value,
>>>>> - &lsm_xattr->value_len);
>>>>> + lsm_xattr, fs_data);
>>>>> if (ret)
>>>>> goto out;
>>>>>
>>>>> evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1;
>>>>> - ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr);
>>>>> + ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs, evm_xattr);
>>>>> if (ret)
>>>>> goto out;
>>>>> ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
>>>>> @@ -1071,10 +1069,13 @@ int security_old_inode_init_security(struct
>> inode
>>>> *inode, struct inode *dir,
>>>>> const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
>>>>> void **value, size_t *len)
>>>>> {
>>>>> + struct xattr xattr = { .name = NULL, .value = NULL, .value_len = 0 };
>>>>> + struct xattr *lsm_xattr = (name && value && len) ? &xattr : NULL;
>>>>> +
>>>>> if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
>>>>> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>>>> return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir,
>>>>> - qstr, name, value, len);
>>>>> + qstr, lsm_xattr, NULL);
>>>>> }
>>>>> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security);
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>>>>> index ddd097790d47..806827eb132a 100644
>>>>> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
>>>>> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>>>>> @@ -2916,11 +2916,11 @@ static int
>> selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct
>>>> dentry *dentry, int mode,
>>>>> static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct
inode
>> *dir,
>>>>> const struct qstr *qstr,
>>>>> - const char **name,
>>>>> - void **value, size_t *len)
>>>>> + struct xattr *xattrs, void *fs_data)
>>>>> {
>>>>> const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
>>>>> struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
>>>>> + struct xattr *xattr = lsm_find_xattr_slot(xattrs);
>>>>> u32 newsid, clen;
>>>>> int rc;
>>>>> char *context;
>>>>> @@ -2947,16 +2947,15 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct
>>>> inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
>>>>> !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
>>>>> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>>>>
>>>>> - if (name)
>>>>> - *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
>>>>> + if (xattr) {
>>>>> + xattr->name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
>>>>>
>>>>> - if (value && len) {
>>>>> rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
>>>>> &context, &clen);
>>>>> if (rc)
>>>>> return rc;
>>>>> - *value = context;
>>>>> - *len = clen;
>>>>> + xattr->value = context;
>>>>> + xattr->value_len = clen;
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> return 0;
>>>>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>>>> index 12a45e61c1a5..af7eee0fee52 100644
>>>>> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>>>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>>>> @@ -962,26 +962,24 @@ static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct
>> inode
>>>> *inode)
>>>>> * @inode: the newly created inode
>>>>> * @dir: containing directory object
>>>>> * @qstr: unused
>>>>> - * @name: where to put the attribute name
>>>>> - * @value: where to put the attribute value
>>>>> - * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
>>>>> + * @xattrs: where to put the attribute
>>>>> *
>>>>> * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
>>>>> */
>>>>> static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode
>>>> *dir,
>>>>> - const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
>>>>> - void **value, size_t *len)
>>>>> + const struct qstr *qstr,
>>>>> + struct xattr *xattrs, void *fs_data)
>>>>> {
>>>>> struct inode_smack *issp = smack_inode(inode);
>>>>> struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
>>>>> struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
>>>>> struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
>>>>> + struct xattr *xattr = lsm_find_xattr_slot(xattrs);
>>>>> int may;
>>>>>
>>>>> - if (name)
>>>>> - *name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
>>>>> + if (xattr) {
>>>>> + xattr->name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
>>>>>
>>>>> - if (value && len) {
>>>>> rcu_read_lock();
>>>>> may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
>>>>> &skp->smk_rules);
>>>>> @@ -999,11 +997,11 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode
>>>> *inode, struct inode *dir,
>>>>> issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> - *value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
>>>>> - if (*value == NULL)
>>>>> + xattr->value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
>>>>> + if (xattr->value == NULL)
>>>>> return -ENOMEM;
>>>>>
>>>>> - *len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
>>>>> + xattr->value_len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> return 0;
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