| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-Id: <E5403A4A-D250-4B31-AFD3-25A54F929896@linux.microsoft.com>
Date: Thu, 6 May 2021 14:05:37 +0530
From: Allen Pais <apais@...ux.microsoft.com>
To: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org>
Cc: Allen Pais <allen.lkml@...il.com>, zajec5@...il.com,
bcm-kernel-feedback-list@...adcom.com,
Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
OP-TEE TrustedFirmware <op-tee@...ts.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] optee: fix tee out of memory failure seen during
kexec reboot
>>
>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> [ 0.368428] tee_bnxt_fw optee-clnt0: tee_shm_alloc failed
>>>>>>>>>> [ 0.368461] tee_bnxt_fw: probe of optee-clnt0 failed with error -22
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> tee_shm_release() is not invoked on dma shm buffer.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Implement .shutdown() method to handle the release of the buffers
>>>>>>>>>> correctly.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> More info:
>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/issues/3637
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Allen Pais <apais@...ux.microsoft.com>
>>>>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>>>>> drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
>>>>>>>>>> 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This looks good to me. Do you have a practical way of testing this on
>>>>>>>>> QEMU for instance?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Jens,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I could not reproduce nor create a setup using QEMU, I could only
>>>>>>>> do it on a real h/w.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I have extensively tested the fix and I don't see any issues.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I did a few test runs too, seems OK.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I carried these changes and have not run into any issues with Kexec so far.
>>>>>> Last week, while trying out kdump, we ran into a crash(this is when the
>>>>>> Kdump kernel reboots).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> $echo c > /proc/sysrq-trigger
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Leads to:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [ 18.004831] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff0008dcef6758
>>>>>> [ 18.013002] Mem abort info:
>>>>>> [ 18.015885] ESR = 0x96000005
>>>>>> [ 18.019034] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
>>>>>> [ 18.024516] SET = 0, FnV = 0
>>>>>> [ 18.027667] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
>>>>>> [ 18.030905] Data abort info:
>>>>>> [ 18.033877] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005
>>>>>> [ 18.037835] CM = 0, WnR = 0
>>>>>> [ 18.040896] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000970a78000
>>>>>> [ 18.047811] [ffff0008dcef6758] pgd=000000097fbf9003, pud=0000000000000000
>>>>>> [ 18.054819] Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
>>>>>> [ 18.059850] Modules linked in: bnxt_en pcie_iproc_platform pcie_iproc diagbe(O)
>>>>>> [ 18.067395] CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Tainted: G O 5.4.83-microsoft-standard #1
>>>>>> [ 18.077174] Hardware name: Overlake (DT)
>>>>>> [ 18.081219] pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO)
>>>>>> [ 18.086170] pc : tee_shm_free+0x18/0x48
>>>>>> [ 18.090126] lr : optee_disable_shm_cache+0xa4/0xf0
>>>>>> [ 18.095066] sp : ffff80001005bb90
>>>>>> [ 18.098484] x29: ffff80001005bb90 x28: ffff000037e20000
>>>>>> [ 18.103962] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffff00003ed10490
>>>>>> [ 18.109440] x25: ffffca760e975f90 x24: 0000000000000000
>>>>>> [ 18.114918] x23: ffffca760ed79808 x22: ffff00003ec66e18
>>>>>> [ 18.120396] x21: ffff80001005bc08 x20: 00000000b200000a
>>>>>> [ 18.125874] x19: ffff0008dcef6700 x18: 0000000000000010
>>>>>> [ 18.131352] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
>>>>>> [ 18.136829] x15: ffffffffffffffff x14: ffffca760ed79808
>>>>>> [ 18.142307] x13: ffff80009005b897 x12: ffff80001005b89f
>>>>>> [ 18.147786] x11: ffffca760eda4000 x10: ffff80001005b820
>>>>>> [ 18.153264] x9 : 00000000ffffffd0 x8 : ffffca760e59b2c0
>>>>>> [ 18.158742] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
>>>>>> [ 18.164220] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000
>>>>>> [ 18.169698] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff0008dcef6700
>>>>>> [ 18.175175] x1 : 00000000ffff0008 x0 : ffffca760e59ca04
>>>>>> [ 18.180654] Call trace:
>>>>>> [ 18.183176] tee_shm_free+0x18/0x48
>>>>>> [ 18.186773] optee_disable_shm_cache+0xa4/0xf0
>>>>>> [ 18.191356] optee_shutdown+0x20/0x30
>>>>>> [ 18.195135] platform_drv_shutdown+0x2c/0x38
>>>>>> [ 18.199538] device_shutdown+0x180/0x298
>>>>>> [ 18.203586] kernel_restart_prepare+0x44/0x50
>>>>>> [ 18.208078] kernel_restart+0x20/0x68
>>>>>> [ 18.211853] __do_sys_reboot+0x104/0x258
>>>>>> [ 18.215899] __arm64_sys_reboot+0x2c/0x38
>>>>>> [ 18.220035] el0_svc_handler+0x90/0x138
>>>>>> [ 18.223991] el0_svc+0x8/0x208
>>>>>> [ 18.227143] Code: f9000bf3 aa0003f3 aa1e03e0 d503201f (b9405a60)
>>>>>> [ 18.233435] ---[ end trace 835d756cd66aa959 ]---
>>>>>> [ 18.238621] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
>>>>>> [ 18.244014] Kernel Offset: 0x4a75fde00000 from 0xffff800010000000
>>>>>> [ 18.250299] PHYS_OFFSET: 0xffff99c680000000
>>>>>> [ 18.254613] CPU features: 0x0002,21806008
>>>>>> [ 18.258747] Memory Limit: none
>>>>>> [ 18.262310] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]—
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I see that before secure world returns OPTEE_SMC_RETURN_ENOTAVAIL(which
>>>>>> Should disable and clear all the cache) we run into the crash trying to free shm.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thoughts?
>>>>>
>>>>> It seems that the pointer is invalid, but the pointer doesn't look
>>>>> like garbage. Could the kernel have unmapped the memory area covering
>>>>> that address?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yes, I am not entirely sure if the kernel had the time to unmap the memory.
>>>> Right after triggering the crash the kdump kernel is booted and I see the following
>>>>
>>>> [ 2.050145] optee: probing for conduit method.
>>>> [ 2.054743] optee: revision 3.6 (f84427aa)
>>>> [ 2.054821] optee: dynamic shared memory is enabled
>>>> [ 2.066186] optee: initialized driver
>>>>
>>>> Could this be previous un-released maps causing corruption?
>>>
>>> Aha, yes, that could be it.
>>>
>>
>> How about checking for the ptr?
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c
>> index aadedec3bfe7..8dc4fe9a1588 100644
>> --- a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c
>> +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c
>> @@ -426,10 +426,12 @@ void optee_disable_shm_cache(struct optee *optee)
>> if (res.result.status == OPTEE_SMC_RETURN_ENOTAVAIL)
>> break; /* All shm's freed */
>> if (res.result.status == OPTEE_SMC_RETURN_OK) {
>> - struct tee_shm *shm;
>> + struct tee_shm *shm = NULL;
>>
>> shm = reg_pair_to_ptr(res.result.shm_upper32,
>> res.result.shm_lower32);
>> + if (IS_ERR(shm))
>> + return PTR_ERR(shm);
>> tee_shm_free(shm);
>
> I don't think that will help. If your theory is correct then that
> pointer is from an older incarnation of the kernel. It could be worth
> trying calling this function just before the call to
> optee_enable_shm_cache() in optee_probe() but skipping the calls to
> `tee_shm_free()` in that case. Since the kernel has restarted these
> returned pointers are not valid any more and there's nothing to free,
> we just need to make sure that secure world stops using those too.
>
I thought about it too, but was not very sure.
Calling optee_disable_shm_cache() before the enable call to ensure
That we have dropped all references to the secure world and looking
To start of fresh. Lemme try that out.
Thanks.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists