Date:   Mon, 10 May 2021 06:10:14 -0500
From:   "Saripalli, RK" <rsaripal@....com>
To:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, mingo@...hat.com,
        bp@...en8.de, hpa@...or.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        bsd@...hat.com, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] x86/cpufeatures: Implement Predictive Store
 Forwarding control.



On 5/7/2021 10:13 AM, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Wed, May 05 2021 at 14:09, Ramakrishna Saripalli wrote:
>> From: Ramakrishna Saripalli <rk.saripalli@....com>
>>
>> Certain AMD processors feature a new technology called Predictive Store
>> Forwarding (PSF).
>>
>> PSF is a micro-architectural optimization designed to improve the
>> performance of code execution by predicting dependencies between
>> loads and stores.
>>
>> Incorrect PSF predictions can occur due to two reasons.
>>
>> - It is possible that the load/store pair may have had dependency for
>>   a while but the dependency has stopped because the address in the
>>   load/store pair has changed.
>>
>> - Second source of incorrect PSF prediction can occur because of an alias
>>   in the PSF predictor structure stored in the microarchitectural state.
>>   PSF predictor tracks load/store pair based on portions of instruction
>>   pointer. It is possible that a load/store pair which does have a
>>   dependency may be aliased by another load/store pair which does not have
>>   the same dependency. This can result in incorrect speculation.
>>
>>   Software may be able to detect this aliasing and perform side-channel
>>   attacks.
> 
> So this is the new post spectre/meltdown/.../ world order.
> 
> What would have been considered a potential speculative side channel bug
> two years ago is now sold a feature which is by default enabled.
> 
> Just to be clear. From a security POV this is just yet another
> default enabled speculative vulnerability. The difference to the others
> is that this is communicated upfront and comes with a knob to turn it
> off right away.
> 
> There is also interaction with SSB and the SSB mitigation which is
> described in the cover letter, but not in the changelog and is not
> detectable from user space.
> 
> I know that you had it implemented that way in your first attempt, but I
> was busy with other things and missed the discussion which resulted in
> this being treated as a feature.
> 
> TBH, I'm not really happy about this because that's inconsistent with
> how we treat the other speculation related issues and there is no way
> for user space to actually check this like the other one via /sys/....
> 
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
>> @@ -1170,3 +1170,22 @@ void set_dr_addr_mask(unsigned long mask, int dr)
>>  		break;
>>  	}
>>  }
>> +
>> +static int __init psf_cmdline(char *str)
>> +{
>> +	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PSFD))
>> +		return 0;
>> +
>> +	if (!str)
>> +		return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> +	if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
>> +		set_cpu_cap(&boot_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
> 
> What? Why is this setting this feature here and why is this not done in
> init_speculation_control() as for all the other speculation misfeatures?
> 
>> +		x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_PSFD;
> 
> What? See below.
> 
>> +		msr_set_bit(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_PSFD_SHIFT);
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	return 0;
> 
> So any parameter is treated as valid here. That's interesting at best.
> 
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
>> @@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
>>  
>>  void __init check_bugs(void)
>>  {
>> +	u64 tmp = 0;
>> +
>>  	identify_boot_cpu();
>>  
>>  	/*
>> @@ -97,7 +99,9 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
>>  	 * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.
>>  	 */
>>  	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
>> -		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
>> +		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, tmp);
>> +
>> +	x86_spec_ctrl_base |= tmp;
> 
> How is anyone supposed to understand that logic?
> 
> Just because x86_spec_ctrl_base is a global variable does not justify
> this hackery at all. It's just a matter of time that someone reads this:
> 
> u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
> 
> void __init check_bugs(void)
> {
> 	u64 tmp = 0;
> 
>         ...
> 
>   	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
> 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, tmp);
> 
> 	x86_spec_ctrl_base |= tmp;
> 
> and figures that this is a pointless exercise and reverts that hunk.
> 
> What's wrong with just treating this in the same way in which we treat
> all other speculative vulnerabilities and provide a consistent picture
> to the user?
> 
> Something like the below. You get the idea.

Thomas, thank you very much for the comments.

I provided the links to the original patches which treat PSF similar to other
speculative vulnerabilities.

Could you review them please?. The first patch is the cover letter.

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210406155004.230790-1-rsaripal@amd.com/
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210406155004.230790-2-rsaripal@amd.com/
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210406155004.230790-3-rsaripal@amd.com/
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210406155004.230790-4-rsaripal@amd.com/
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210406155004.230790-5-rsaripal@amd.com/
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210406155004.230790-6-rsaripal@amd.com/

Thanks,
RK



> 
> Thanks,
> 
>         tglx
> ---
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
>  	mds_select_mitigation();
>  	taa_select_mitigation();
>  	srbds_select_mitigation();
> +	psf_select_mitigation();
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, print MDS
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> @@ -891,6 +891,9 @@ static void init_speculation_control(str
>  		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
>  		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD);
>  	}
> +
> +	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PSFD))
> +		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
>  }
>  
>  void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> 

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