linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] x86/cpufeatures: Implement Predictive Store Forwarding control.

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Mon, 10 May 2021 23:44:03 +0200
From:   Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
To:     "Saripalli\, RK" <rsaripal@....com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, mingo@...hat.com,
        bp@...en8.de, hpa@...or.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        bsd@...hat.com, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] x86/cpufeatures: Implement Predictive Store Forwarding control.

On Mon, May 10 2021 at 06:10, RK Saripalli wrote:
> On 5/7/2021 10:13 AM, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>> What's wrong with just treating this in the same way in which we treat
>> all other speculative vulnerabilities and provide a consistent picture
>> to the user?
>> 
>> Something like the below. You get the idea.
>
> Thomas, thank you very much for the comments.
>
> I provided the links to the original patches which treat PSF similar to other
> speculative vulnerabilities.
>
> Could you review them please?. The first patch is the cover letter.
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210406155004.230790-1-rsaripal@amd.com/
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210406155004.230790-2-rsaripal@amd.com/
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210406155004.230790-3-rsaripal@amd.com/
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210406155004.230790-4-rsaripal@amd.com/
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210406155004.230790-5-rsaripal@amd.com/
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210406155004.230790-6-rsaripal@amd.com/

They are going into the right direction, i.e. detection and reporting.

Vs. mitigation control the question is whether we need the full
machinery of prctl/seccomp and so forth especially under the aspect that
the SSBD mitigation already covers the PSF issue.

So for the start a simple on/off might be good enough.

Kees, any opinions?

Thanks,

        tglx