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Message-ID: <20210521171132.ev56j4isuxtf2zqa@e107158-lin.cambridge.arm.com>
Date: Fri, 21 May 2021 18:11:32 +0100
From: Qais Yousef <qais.yousef@....com>
To: Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Morten Rasmussen <morten.rasmussen@....com>,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>,
Quentin Perret <qperret@...gle.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Li Zefan <lizefan@...wei.com>,
Johannes Weiner <hannes@...xchg.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@...hat.com>,
Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@...aro.org>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...ysocki.net>, kernel-team@...roid.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 12/21] sched: Allow task CPU affinity to be restricted
on asymmetric systems
On 05/18/21 10:47, Will Deacon wrote:
> Asymmetric systems may not offer the same level of userspace ISA support
> across all CPUs, meaning that some applications cannot be executed by
> some CPUs. As a concrete example, upcoming arm64 big.LITTLE designs do
> not feature support for 32-bit applications on both clusters.
>
> Although userspace can carefully manage the affinity masks for such
> tasks, one place where it is particularly problematic is execve()
> because the CPU on which the execve() is occurring may be incompatible
> with the new application image. In such a situation, it is desirable to
> restrict the affinity mask of the task and ensure that the new image is
> entered on a compatible CPU. From userspace's point of view, this looks
> the same as if the incompatible CPUs have been hotplugged off in the
> task's affinity mask. Similarly, if a subsequent execve() reverts to
> a compatible image, then the old affinity is restored if it is still
> valid.
>
> In preparation for restricting the affinity mask for compat tasks on
> arm64 systems without uniform support for 32-bit applications, introduce
> {force,relax}_compatible_cpus_allowed_ptr(), which respectively restrict
> and restore the affinity mask for a task based on the compatible CPUs.
>
> Reviewed-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@...gle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
> ---
> include/linux/sched.h | 2 +
> kernel/sched/core.c | 165 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> kernel/sched/sched.h | 1 +
> 3 files changed, 152 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
> index db32d4f7e5b3..91a6cfeae242 100644
> --- a/include/linux/sched.h
> +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
> @@ -1691,6 +1691,8 @@ extern void do_set_cpus_allowed(struct task_struct *p, const struct cpumask *new
> extern int set_cpus_allowed_ptr(struct task_struct *p, const struct cpumask *new_mask);
> extern int dup_user_cpus_ptr(struct task_struct *dst, struct task_struct *src, int node);
> extern void release_user_cpus_ptr(struct task_struct *p);
> +extern void force_compatible_cpus_allowed_ptr(struct task_struct *p);
> +extern void relax_compatible_cpus_allowed_ptr(struct task_struct *p);
> #else
> static inline void do_set_cpus_allowed(struct task_struct *p, const struct cpumask *new_mask)
> {
> diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
> index 808bbe669a6d..ba66bcf8e812 100644
> --- a/kernel/sched/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
> @@ -2357,26 +2357,21 @@ static int affine_move_task(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, struct rq_flag
> }
>
> /*
> - * Change a given task's CPU affinity. Migrate the thread to a
> - * proper CPU and schedule it away if the CPU it's executing on
> - * is removed from the allowed bitmask.
> - *
> - * NOTE: the caller must have a valid reference to the task, the
> - * task must not exit() & deallocate itself prematurely. The
> - * call is not atomic; no spinlocks may be held.
> + * Called with both p->pi_lock and rq->lock held; drops both before returning.
> */
> -static int __set_cpus_allowed_ptr(struct task_struct *p,
> - const struct cpumask *new_mask,
> - u32 flags)
> +static int __set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked(struct task_struct *p,
> + const struct cpumask *new_mask,
> + u32 flags,
> + struct rq *rq,
> + struct rq_flags *rf)
> + __releases(rq->lock)
> + __releases(p->pi_lock)
> {
> const struct cpumask *cpu_valid_mask = cpu_active_mask;
> const struct cpumask *cpu_allowed_mask = task_cpu_possible_mask(p);
> unsigned int dest_cpu;
> - struct rq_flags rf;
> - struct rq *rq;
> int ret = 0;
>
> - rq = task_rq_lock(p, &rf);
> update_rq_clock(rq);
>
> if (p->flags & PF_KTHREAD || is_migration_disabled(p)) {
> @@ -2430,20 +2425,158 @@ static int __set_cpus_allowed_ptr(struct task_struct *p,
>
> __do_set_cpus_allowed(p, new_mask, flags);
>
> - return affine_move_task(rq, p, &rf, dest_cpu, flags);
> + if (flags & SCA_USER)
> + release_user_cpus_ptr(p);
Why do we need to release the pointer here?
Doesn't this mean if a 32bit task requests to change its affinity, then we'll
lose this info and a subsequent execve() to a 64bit application means we won't
be able to restore the original mask?
ie:
p0-64bit
execve(32bit_app)
// p1-32bit created
p1-32bit.change_affinity()
relase_user_cpus_ptr()
execve(64bit_app) // lost info about p0 affinity?
Hmm I think this helped me to get the answer. p1 changed its affinity, then
there's nothing to be inherited by a new execve(), so yes we no longer need
this info.
> +
> + return affine_move_task(rq, p, rf, dest_cpu, flags);
>
> out:
> - task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &rf);
> + task_rq_unlock(rq, p, rf);
>
> return ret;
> }
[...]
> +/*
> + * Change a given task's CPU affinity to the intersection of its current
> + * affinity mask and @subset_mask, writing the resulting mask to @new_mask
> + * and pointing @p->user_cpus_ptr to a copy of the old mask.
> + * If the resulting mask is empty, leave the affinity unchanged and return
> + * -EINVAL.
> + */
> +static int restrict_cpus_allowed_ptr(struct task_struct *p,
> + struct cpumask *new_mask,
> + const struct cpumask *subset_mask)
> +{
> + struct rq_flags rf;
> + struct rq *rq;
> + int err;
> + struct cpumask *user_mask = NULL;
> +
> + if (!p->user_cpus_ptr)
> + user_mask = kmalloc(cpumask_size(), GFP_KERNEL);
> +
> + rq = task_rq_lock(p, &rf);
> +
> + /*
> + * We're about to butcher the task affinity, so keep track of what
> + * the user asked for in case we're able to restore it later on.
> + */
> + if (user_mask) {
> + cpumask_copy(user_mask, p->cpus_ptr);
> + p->user_cpus_ptr = user_mask;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Forcefully restricting the affinity of a deadline task is
> + * likely to cause problems, so fail and noisily override the
> + * mask entirely.
> + */
> + if (task_has_dl_policy(p) && dl_bandwidth_enabled()) {
> + err = -EPERM;
> + goto err_unlock;
free(user_mark) first?
> + }
> +
> + if (!cpumask_and(new_mask, &p->cpus_mask, subset_mask)) {
> + err = -EINVAL;
> + goto err_unlock;
ditto
> + }
> +
> + return __set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked(p, new_mask, false, rq, &rf);
> +
> +err_unlock:
> + task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &rf);
> + return err;
> +}
Thanks
--
Qais Yousef
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