linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v1 1/8] virtio: Force only split mode with protected guest

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Date:   Thu, 03 Jun 2021 15:17:34 -0700
From:   "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@...nel.org>
To:     "Andi Kleen" <ak@...ux.intel.com>, mst@...hat.com
Cc:     "Jason Wang" <jasowang@...hat.com>,
        virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org, hch@....de,
        m.szyprowski@...sung.com, robin.murphy@....com,
        iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
        sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com,
        "Josh Poimboeuf" <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        "Linux Kernel Mailing List" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/8] virtio: Force only split mode with protected guest



On Thu, Jun 3, 2021, at 12:53 PM, Andi Kleen wrote:
> 
> > Tell that to every crypto downgrade attack ever.
> 
> That's exactly what this patch addresses.
> 
> >
> > I see two credible solutions:
> >
> > 1. Actually harden the virtio driver.
> That's exactly what this patchkit, and the alternative approaches, like 
> Jason's, are doing.
> >
> > 2. Have a new virtio-modern driver and use it for modern use cases. Maybe rename the old driver virtio-legacy or virtio-insecure.  They can share code.
> 
> In most use cases the legacy driver is not insecure because there is no 
> memory protection anyways.
> 
> Yes maybe such a split would be a good idea for maintenance and maybe 
> performance reasons, but at least from the security perspective I don't 
> see any need for it.


Please reread my email.

We do not need an increasing pile of kludges to make TDX and SEV “secure”.  We need the actual loaded driver to be secure.  The virtio architecture is full of legacy nonsense, and there is no good reason for SEV and TDX to be a giant special case.

As I said before, real PCIe (Thunderbolt/USB-C or anything else) has the exact same problem.  The fact that TDX has encrypted memory is, at best, a poor proxy for the actual condition.  The actual condition is that the host does not trust the device to implement the virtio protocol correctly.

> 
> >
> > Another snag you may hit: virtio’s heuristic for whether to use proper DMA ops or to bypass them is a giant kludge. I’m very slightly optimistic that getting the heuristic wrong will make the driver fail to operate but won’t allow the host to take over the guest, but I’m not really convinced. And I wrote that code!  A virtio-modern mode probably should not have a heuristic, and the various iommu-bypassing modes should be fixed to work at the bus level, not the device level
> 
> TDX and SEV use the arch hook to enforce DMA API, so that part is also 
> solved.
> 

Can you point me to the code you’re referring to?

> 
> -Andi
> 
>