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Date: Tue, 08 Jun 2021 09:32:06 +0300
From: Sergey Nazarov <s-nazarov@...dex.ru>
To: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-audit@...hat.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2] audit: Rename enum audit_state constants to avoid
AUDIT_DISABLED redefinition
AUDIT_DISABLED defined in kernel/audit.h as element of enum audit_state
and redefined in kernel/audit.c. This produces a warning when kernel builds
with syscalls audit disabled and brokes kernel build if -Werror used.
enum audit_state used in syscall audit code only. This patch changes
enum audit_state constants prefix AUDIT to AUDIT_STATE to avoid
AUDIT_DISABLED redefinition.
v2: the comments of Richard Guy Briggs and Paul Moore were taken into account
Signed-off-by: Sergey Nazarov <s-nazarov@...dex.ru>
---
kernel/audit.h | 8 ++++----
kernel/auditsc.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++-----------------
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 1522e10..e518ad9 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -21,16 +21,16 @@
a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
the syscall filter. */
enum audit_state {
- AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
+ AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
* No syscall-specific audit records can
* be generated. */
- AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
+ AUDIT_STATE_BUILD, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
* and fill it in at syscall
* entry time. This makes a full
* syscall record available if some
* other part of the kernel decides it
* should be recorded. */
- AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context,
+ AUDIT_STATE_RECORD /* Create the per-task audit_context,
* always fill it in at syscall entry
* time, and always write out the audit
* record at syscall exit time. */
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static inline int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
return 0;
}
-#define audit_filter_inodes(t, c) AUDIT_DISABLED
+#define audit_filter_inodes(t, c) AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 175ef6f..92ca5a2 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
{
if (!ctx->prio) {
ctx->prio = 1;
- ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
+ ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
}
}
@@ -751,10 +751,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
}
switch (rule->action) {
case AUDIT_NEVER:
- *state = AUDIT_DISABLED;
+ *state = AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED;
break;
case AUDIT_ALWAYS:
- *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
+ *state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
break;
}
return 1;
@@ -773,14 +773,14 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
&state, true)) {
- if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
+ if (state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
*key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
rcu_read_unlock();
return state;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
- return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
+ return AUDIT_STATE_BUILD;
}
static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if the audit_state is
* not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is also not
* high enough that we already know we have to write an audit record
- * (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
+ * (i.e., the state is AUDIT_STATE_BUILD).
*/
static void audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_context *ctx)
@@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
if (!context)
return NULL;
context->state = state;
- context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
+ context->prio = state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
context->fds[0] = -1;
@@ -950,7 +950,7 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
- if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) {
+ if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED) {
clear_task_syscall_work(tsk, SYSCALL_AUDIT);
return 0;
}
@@ -1628,7 +1628,7 @@ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context);
audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
- if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
+ if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
audit_log_exit();
}
@@ -1647,7 +1647,7 @@ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
* audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
* filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
- * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
+ * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_STATE_RECORD,
* then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
* will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
* be written).
@@ -1664,11 +1664,11 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
state = context->state;
- if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
+ if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED)
return;
context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
- if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
+ if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_STATE_BUILD) {
context->prio = 0;
if (auditd_test_task(current))
return;
@@ -1693,7 +1693,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
* @return_code: return value of the syscall
*
* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
- * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
+ * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_STATE_RECORD state from
* filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
* message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
* free the names stored from getname().
@@ -1735,12 +1735,12 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
audit_filter_syscall(current, context);
audit_filter_inodes(current, context);
- if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
+ if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
audit_log_exit();
}
context->in_syscall = 0;
- context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
+ context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0;
audit_free_module(context);
audit_free_names(context);
@@ -1753,7 +1753,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
context->sockaddr_len = 0;
context->type = 0;
context->fds[0] = -1;
- if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
+ if (context->state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) {
kfree(context->filterkey);
context->filterkey = NULL;
}
@@ -2203,7 +2203,7 @@ int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
*serial = ctx->serial;
if (!ctx->prio) {
ctx->prio = 1;
- ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
+ ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
}
return 1;
}
--
1.8.3.1
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