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Message-ID: <CAPcyv4ismoYra_8=Qj=XLLs9+18tRiv8Y48GJWOAHvpzi3BZiw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 2021 14:38:26 -0700
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Kirill Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <knsathya@...nel.org>,
Raj Ashok <ashok.raj@...el.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2-fix-v5 1/1] x86: Skip WBINVD instruction for VM guest
On Wed, Jun 9, 2021 at 2:03 PM Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote:
>
> This changelog lacks both clear problem statements and a clear solution
> implemented within the patch.
>
> Here's a proposed changelog. It clearly spells out the two problems
> caused by WBINVD within a guest, and the proposed solution which fixes
> those two problems.
Looks good to me modulo the comment below...
>
> Is this missing anything?
>
> --
>
> VM guests that support ACPI use standard ACPI mechanisms to signal sleep
> state entry to the host. To ACPI, reboot is simply another sleep state.
>
> ACPI specifies that the platform preserve memory contents over (some)
> sleep states. It does not specify any requirements for data
> preservation in CPU caches. The ACPI specification mandates the use of
> WBINVD to flush the contents of the CPU caches to memory before entering
> specific sleep states, thus ensuring data in caches can survive sleep
> state transitions.e
>
> Unlike when entering sleep states bare metal, no actions within a guest
> can cause data in processor caches to be lost. That makes these WBINVD
> invocations harmless but superfluous within a guest. (<--- problem #1)
>
> In TDX guests, these WBINVD operations cause #VE exceptions. For debug,
> it would be ideal for the #VE handler to be able to WARN() when an
> unexpected WBINVD occurs. (<--- problem #2)
...but it doesn't WARN() it triggers unhandled #VE, unless I missed
another patch that precedes this that turns it into a WARN()? If a
code path expects WBINVD for correct operation and the guest can't
execute that sounds fatal, not a WARN to me.
> Avoid WBINVD for all ACPI cache-flushing operations which occur while
> running under a hypervisor, which includes TDX guests. This both avoids
> TDX warnings and optimizes away superfluous WBINVD invocations. (<----
> solution)
>
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