[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <YM+zbxOj5Bxl5R8D@zn.tnic>
Date: Sun, 20 Jun 2021 23:30:23 +0200
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>,
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Kan Liang <kan.liang@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [patch V3 11/66] x86/fpu: Sanitize xstateregs_set()
On Fri, Jun 18, 2021 at 04:18:34PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> xstateregs_set() operates on a stopped task and tries to copy the provided
> buffer into the task's fpu.state.xsave buffer.
>
> Any error while copying or invalid state detected after copying results in
> wiping the target task's FPU state completely including supervisor states.
>
> That's just wrong. The caller supplied invalid data or has a problem with
> unmapped memory, so there is absolutely no justification to corrupt the
> target state.
>
> Fix this with the following modifications:
>
> 1) If data has to be copied from userspace, allocate a buffer and copy from
> user first.
>
> 2) Use copy_kernel_to_xstate() unconditionally so that header checking
> works correctly.
>
> 3) Return on error without corrupting the target state.
>
> This prevents corrupting states and lets the caller deal with the problem
> it caused in the first place.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 4 ---
> arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c | 44 +++++++++++++++-----------------------
> arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 14 ++++++------
> 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Nice!
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg
Powered by blists - more mailing lists