Message-ID: <714571a1-e8dd-3417-b5ab-2a6d611fb3ee@pengutronix.de>
Date:   Wed, 14 Jul 2021 11:29:25 +0200
From:   Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>
To:     Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Fabio Estevam <festevam@...il.com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        NXP Linux Team <linux-imx@....com>,
        Pengutronix Kernel Team <kernel@...gutronix.de>,
        Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@...gutronix.de>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Shawn Guo <shawnguo@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP DCP-based
 trusted keys

Hello Richard,

On 14.06.21 22:16, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> DCP (Data Co-Processor) is the little brother of NXP's CAAM IP.
> 
> Beside of accelerated crypto operations, it also offers support for
> hardware-bound keys. Using this feature it is possible to implement a blob
> mechanism just like CAAM offers. Unlike on CAAM, constructing and
> parsing the blob has to happen in software.
> 
> We chose the following format for the blob:
> /*
>  * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format.
>  *
>  * @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1
>  * @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload,
>  *            @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in
>  *            AES-128-ECB mode by DCP.
>  * @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption.
>  * @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload.
>  * @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key,
>  *           GCM auth tag of size AES_BLOCK_SIZE is attached at the end of it.
>  *
>  * The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + @payload_len +
>  * AES_BLOCK_SIZE.
>  */
> struct dcp_blob_fmt {
> 	__u8 fmt_version;
> 	__u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
> 	__u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
> 	__le32 payload_len;
> 	__u8 payload[0];

There's been ongoing effort to replace the [0] GNU extension with C99
flexible array members. Please use [] here as well.

> } __packed;
> 
> @payload is the key provided by trusted_key_ops->seal().
> 
> By default the UNIQUE device key is used, it is also possible to use
> the OTP key. While the UNIQUE device key should be unique it is not
> entirely clear whether this is the case due to unclear documentation.
> If someone wants to be sure they can burn their own unique key
> into the OTP fuse and set the use_otp_key module parameter.
> 
> Cc: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>
> Cc: David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
> Cc: Fabio Estevam <festevam@...il.com>
> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>
> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
> Cc: keyrings@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org
> Cc: linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-doc@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
> Cc: NXP Linux Team <linux-imx@....com>
> Cc: Pengutronix Kernel Team <kernel@...gutronix.de>
> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
> Cc: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@...gutronix.de>
> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
> Cc: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@...nel.org>
> Co-developed-by: David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>
> Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
> ---
>  .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |   1 +
>  MAINTAINERS                                   |   9 +
>  include/keys/trusted_dcp.h                    |  13 +
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile           |   1 +
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c     |   6 +-
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c      | 325 ++++++++++++++++++
>  6 files changed, 354 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>  create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_dcp.h
>  create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index cb89dbdedc46..d8b2aa94a566 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -5639,6 +5639,7 @@
>  			sources:
>  			- "tpm"
>  			- "tee"
> +			- "dcp"
>  			If not specified then it defaults to iterating through
>  			the trust source list starting with TPM and assigns the
>  			first trust source as a backend which is initialized
> diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
> index b706dd20ff2b..779cac00827c 100644
> --- a/MAINTAINERS
> +++ b/MAINTAINERS
> @@ -10099,6 +10099,15 @@ F:	include/keys/trusted-type.h
>  F:	include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
>  F:	security/keys/trusted-keys/
>  
> +KEYS-TRUSTED-DCP
> +M:	David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>
> +M:	Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
> +L:	linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
> +L:	keyrings@...r.kernel.org
> +S:	Supported
> +F:	include/keys/trusted_dcp.h
> +F:	security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c

Hmm, I didn't add a MAINTAINERS entry for CAAM trusted keys. Do you think I should?

> +
>  KEYS-TRUSTED-TEE
>  M:	Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
>  L:	linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h b/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..7b2a1275c527
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh
> + * Authors: David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>
> + *          Richard Weinberger <richard@...ma-star.at>
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef TRUSTED_DCP_H
> +#define TRUSTED_DCP_H
> +
> +extern struct trusted_key_ops dcp_trusted_key_ops;
> +
> +#endif
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
> index feb8b6c3cc79..992b591692dc 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
> @@ -12,3 +12,4 @@ trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o
>  trusted-y += tpm2key.asn1.o
>  
>  trusted-$(CONFIG_TEE) += trusted_tee.o
> +trusted-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP) += trusted_dcp.o
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> index d5c891d8d353..66b631ffe876 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
>  
>  #include <keys/user-type.h>
>  #include <keys/trusted-type.h>
> +#include <keys/trusted_dcp.h>
>  #include <keys/trusted_tee.h>
>  #include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
>  #include <linux/capability.h>
> @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@
>  
>  static char *trusted_key_source;
>  module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0);
> -MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm or tee)");
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee or dcp)");
>  
>  static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = {
>  #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM)
> @@ -33,6 +34,9 @@ static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = {
>  #if defined(CONFIG_TEE)
>  	{ "tee", &trusted_key_tee_ops },
>  #endif
> +#if defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP)
> +	{ "dcp", &dcp_trusted_key_ops },
> +#endif
>  };
>  
>  DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_init, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->init);
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..02db5dc261c7
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh
> + * Authors: David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>
> + *          Richard Weinberger <richard@...ma-star.at>
> + */
> +
> +#include <crypto/aead.h>
> +#include <crypto/aes.h>
> +#include <crypto/algapi.h>
> +#include <crypto/gcm.h>
> +#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
> +#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
> +#include <linux/key-type.h>
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/mxs-dcp.h>
> +#include <linux/printk.h>
> +#include <linux/random.h>
> +#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
> +
> +#define DCP_BLOB_VERSION 1
> +#define DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN 16
> +
> +/**
> + * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format.
> + *
> + * @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1.
> + * @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload,
> + *            @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in
> + *            AES-128-ECB mode by DCP.
> + * @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption.
> + * @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload.
> + * @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key,
> + *           GCM auth tag of size DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN is attached at the end of it.
> + *
> + * The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + @payload_len +
> + * DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN.
> + */
> +struct dcp_blob_fmt {
> +	__u8 fmt_version;
> +	__u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
> +	__u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
> +	__le32 payload_len;
> +	__u8 payload[0];

[], see above.

> +} __packed;
> +
> +static bool use_otp_key;
> +module_param_named(dcp_use_otp_key, use_otp_key, bool, 0);
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(dcp_use_otp_key, "Use OTP instead of UNIQUE key for sealing");

Shouldn't these be documented in admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt as well?

> +static bool skip_zk_test;
> +module_param_named(dcp_skip_zk_test, skip_zk_test, bool, 0);
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(dcp_skip_zk_test, "Don't test whether device keys are zero'ed");

Does this need to be configurible? I'd assume this can only happen when using an
unfused OTP. In such a case, it's ok to always warn, so you don't need to make
this configurible.

> +
> +static unsigned int calc_blob_len(unsigned int payload_len)
> +{
> +	return sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + payload_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN;
> +}
> +
> +static int do_dcp_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, bool is_encrypt)

I assume in can't be const because the use with sg APIs?

> +{
> +	int res = 0;
> +	struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
> +	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
> +	struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
> +	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
> +	u8 paes_key[DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE];
> +
> +	if (!use_otp_key)

I'd invert this. Makes code easier to read.

> +		paes_key[0] = DCP_PAES_KEY_UNIQUE;
> +	else
> +		paes_key[0] = DCP_PAES_KEY_OTP;
> +
> +	tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb-paes-dcp", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
> +				    CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL);
> +	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
> +		res = PTR_ERR(tfm);
> +		pr_err("Unable to request DCP pAES-ECB cipher: %i\n", res);

Can you define pr_fmt above? There's also %pe now that can directly print out an
error pointer.

> +		tfm = NULL;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
> +	if (!req) {
> +		res = -ENOMEM;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
> +				      CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
> +				      crypto_req_done, &wait);
> +	res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, paes_key, sizeof(paes_key));
> +	if (res < 0)
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	sg_init_one(&src_sg, in, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
> +	sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
> +	skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, AES_KEYSIZE_128,
> +				   NULL);
> +
> +	if (is_encrypt)
> +		res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
> +	else
> +		res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req), &wait);
> +
> +out:
> +	skcipher_request_free(req);
> +	crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
> +
> +	return res;
> +}
> +
> +static int do_aead_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, u8 *key, u8 *nonce,
> +			  bool is_encrypt)
> +{
> +	struct aead_request *aead_req = NULL;
> +	struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
> +	struct crypto_aead *aead;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	aead = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
> +	if (IS_ERR(aead)) {
> +		ret = PTR_ERR(aead);
> +		pr_err("Unable to request AES-GCM cipher: %i\n", ret);
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(aead, DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN);
> +	if (ret < 0) {
> +		pr_err("Can't set crypto auth tag len: %d\n", ret);
> +		goto free_aead;
> +	}
> +
> +	aead_req = aead_request_alloc(aead, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!aead_req) {
> +		ret = -ENOMEM;
> +		goto free_aead;
> +	}
> +
> +	sg_init_one(&src_sg, in, len);
> +	if (is_encrypt) {
> +		/*
> +		 * If we encrypt our buffer has extra space for the auth tag.
> +		 */
> +		sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN);
> +	} else {
> +		sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, len);
> +	}
> +
> +	aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, len, nonce);
> +	aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL,
> +				  NULL);
> +	aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, 0);
> +
> +	if (crypto_aead_setkey(aead, key, AES_KEYSIZE_128)) {
> +		pr_err("Can't set crypto AEAD key\n");
> +		ret = -EINVAL;
> +		goto free_req;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (is_encrypt)
> +		ret = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
> +	else
> +		ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
> +
> +free_req:
> +	aead_request_free(aead_req);
> +free_aead:
> +	crypto_free_aead(aead);
> +out:
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int decrypt_blob_key(u8 *key)
> +{
> +	return do_dcp_crypto(key, key, false);
> +}
> +
> +static int encrypt_blob_key(u8 *key)
> +{
> +	return do_dcp_crypto(key, key, true);
> +}
> +
> +static int trusted_dcp_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> +{
> +	struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob;
> +	int blen, ret;
> +
> +	blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len);
> +	if (blen > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) {
> +		ret = -E2BIG;
> +		goto out;

Nitpick, just return and drop the goto?

> +	}
> +
> +	b->fmt_version = DCP_BLOB_VERSION;
> +	get_random_bytes(b->nonce, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
> +	get_random_bytes(b->blob_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
> +
> +	ret = do_aead_crypto(p->key, b->payload, p->key_len, b->blob_key,
> +			     b->nonce, true);
> +	if (ret) {
> +		pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob payload: %i\n", ret);
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	ret = encrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key);
> +	if (ret) {
> +		pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob key: %i\n", ret);
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	b->payload_len = cpu_to_le32(p->key_len);

 - payload_len is at offset 33, but MIN_KEY_SIZE == 32 and there are no minimum
   size checks. Couldn't you read beyond the buffer this way?

 - offset 33 is unaligned for payload_len. Please use get_unaligned_le32 here.


> +	p->blob_len = blen;
> +	ret = 0;
> +out:
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int trusted_dcp_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> +{
> +	struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob;
> +	int blen, ret;
> +
> +	if (b->fmt_version != DCP_BLOB_VERSION) {
> +		pr_err("DCP blob has bad version: %i, expected %i\n",
> +		       b->fmt_version, DCP_BLOB_VERSION);
> +		ret = -EINVAL;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	p->key_len = le32_to_cpu(b->payload_len);
> +	blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len);
> +	if (blen != p->blob_len) {
> +		pr_err("DCP blob has bad length: %i != %i\n", blen,
> +		       p->blob_len);
> +		ret = -EINVAL;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	ret = decrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key);
> +	if (ret) {
> +		pr_err("Unable to decrypt blob key: %i\n", ret);
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	ret = do_aead_crypto(b->payload, p->key, p->key_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN,
> +			     b->blob_key, b->nonce, false);
> +	if (ret) {
> +		pr_err("Unwrap of DCP payload failed: %i\n", ret);
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	ret = 0;
> +out:
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int trusted_dcp_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
> +{
> +	get_random_bytes(key, key_len);
> +
> +	return key_len;
> +}

jfyi, in the prelude of my CAAM series, I made this the default
when .get_random == NULL.

> +
> +static int test_for_zero_key(void)
> +{
> +	static const u8 bad[] = {0x9a, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x54, 0xf6, 0x3d, 0xfa, 0xff,
> +				 0x5e, 0xa1, 0x8e, 0x45, 0xed, 0xf6, 0xea, 0x6f};
> +	void *buf = NULL;
> +	int ret = 0;
> +
> +	if (skip_zk_test)
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	buf = kmalloc(AES_BLOCK_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!buf) {
> +		ret = -ENOMEM;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	memset(buf, 0x55, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
> +
> +	ret = do_dcp_crypto(buf, buf, true);
> +	if (ret)
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	if (memcmp(buf, bad, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0) {
> +		pr_err("Device neither in secure nor trusted mode!\n");

What's the difference between secure and trusted? Can't this test be skipped
if use_otp_key == false?

> +		ret = -EINVAL;
> +	}
> +out:
> +	kfree(buf);
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int trusted_dcp_init(void)
> +{
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	if (use_otp_key)
> +		pr_info("Using DCP OTP key\n");
> +
> +	ret = test_for_zero_key();
> +	if (ret) {
> +		pr_err("Test for zero'ed keys failed: %i\n", ret);
> +
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	}
> +
> +	return register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
> +}
> +
> +static void trusted_dcp_exit(void)
> +{
> +	unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
> +}
> +
> +struct trusted_key_ops dcp_trusted_key_ops = {
> +	.exit = trusted_dcp_exit,
> +	.init = trusted_dcp_init,
> +	.seal = trusted_dcp_seal,
> +	.unseal = trusted_dcp_unseal,
> +	.get_random = trusted_dcp_get_random,
> +	.migratable = 0,
> +};

Cheers,
Ahmad


-- 
Pengutronix e.K.                           |                             |
Steuerwalder Str. 21                       | http://www.pengutronix.de/  |
31137 Hildesheim, Germany                  | Phone: +49-5121-206917-0    |
Amtsgericht Hildesheim, HRA 2686           | Fax:   +49-5121-206917-5555 |

Powered by blists - more mailing lists