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Message-ID: <CAPcyv4gSsL5hk=CSk=9duqCN3VDS_T2LaYRL+_zK9VOkO8NB+A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 2021 14:28:32 -0700
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
To: Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
"Rafael J . Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <knsathya@...nel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1] driver: base: Add driver filter support
On Wed, Aug 4, 2021 at 2:07 PM Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Aug 04, 2021 at 01:11:27PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> > On Wed, Aug 4, 2021 at 12:29 PM Greg Kroah-Hartman
> > <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > > Why not just make distros that want to support this type of platform,
> > > also provide these tiny kernel images? Why are you pushing this work on
> > > the kernel community instead?
> >
> > In fact, these questions are where I started when first encountering
> > this proposal. Andi has addressed the single kernel image constraint,
> > but I want to pick up on this "pushing work to the kernel community"
> > contention. The small list of vetted drivers that a TDX guest needs
> > will be built-in and maintained in the kernel by the protected guest
> > developer community, so no "pushing work" there. However, given that
> > any driver disable mechanism needs to touch the driver core I
> > advocated to go ahead and make this a general purpose capability to
> > pick up where this [1] conversation left off. I.e. a general facility
> > for the corner cases that modprobe and kernel config policy can not
> > reach. Corner cases like VMM attacking the VM, or broken hardware with
> > a built-in driver that can't be unbound after the fact.
>
> I don't understand how this defends against a hypervisor attacking a
> guest. If the hardware exists, the hypervisor can access it, regardless
> of whether the driver is default-disabled by configuration.
The "hardware" in this case is virtual devices presented by the VMM to
the VM. So if a driver misbehaves in a useful way for an attacker to
exploit, they can stimulate that behavior with a custom crafted
virtual device, and that driver will autoload unaware of the threat
without this filter for vetted drivers.
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