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Message-ID: <20210922152250.4e7c869a@gandalf.local.home>
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 2021 15:22:50 -0400
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
To: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@...gle.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
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linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel: introduce prctl(PR_LOG_UACCESS)
On Wed, 22 Sep 2021 19:46:47 +0200
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com> wrote:
> > All signals except SIGKILL and SIGSTOP are masked for the interval
> > between the prctl() and the next syscall in order to prevent handlers
> > for intervening asynchronous signals from issuing syscalls that may
> > cause uaccesses from the wrong syscall to be logged.
>
> Stupid question: can this be exploited from user space to effectively
> disable SIGKILL for a long time ... and do we care?
I first misread it too, but then caught my mistake reading it a second
time. It says "except SIGKILL". So no, it does not disable SIGKILL.
-- Steve
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