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Message-ID: <CAMkAt6rzFvscq46CKYrhcf3d8VCGzy3tiM_SycnDRr9gVwXOSA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 2021 15:33:07 -0600
From: Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Cc: x86@...nel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Sergio Lopez <slp@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@....com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, tony.luck@...el.com,
Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>,
sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH Part2 v5 42/45] KVM: SVM: Provide support for
SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event
On Fri, Aug 20, 2021 at 10:01 AM Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com> wrote:
>
> Version 2 of GHCB specification added the support for two SNP Guest
> Request Message NAE events. The events allows for an SEV-SNP guest to
> make request to the SEV-SNP firmware through hypervisor using the
> SNP_GUEST_REQUEST API define in the SEV-SNP firmware specification.
>
> The SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST is similar to SNP_GUEST_REQUEST with the
> difference of an additional certificate blob that can be passed through
> the SNP_SET_CONFIG ioctl defined in the CCP driver. The CCP driver
> provides snp_guest_ext_guest_request() that is used by the KVM to get
> both the report and certificate data at once.
>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 197 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 +
> 2 files changed, 193 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 712e8907bc39..81ccad412e55 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
> #include <linux/trace_events.h>
> #include <linux/sev.h>
> #include <linux/ksm.h>
> +#include <linux/sev-guest.h>
> #include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
>
> #include <asm/pkru.h>
> @@ -338,6 +339,7 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>
> init_srcu_struct(&sev->psc_srcu);
> ret = sev_snp_init(&argp->error);
> + mutex_init(&sev->guest_req_lock);
> } else {
> ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
> }
> @@ -1602,23 +1604,39 @@ static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>
> static void *snp_context_create(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> {
> + void *context = NULL, *certs_data = NULL, *resp_page = NULL;
> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> struct sev_data_snp_gctx_create data = {};
> - void *context;
> int rc;
>
> + /* Allocate memory used for the certs data in SNP guest request */
> + certs_data = kmalloc(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> + if (!certs_data)
> + return NULL;
> +
> /* Allocate memory for context page */
> context = snp_alloc_firmware_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> if (!context)
> - return NULL;
> + goto e_free;
> +
> + /* Allocate a firmware buffer used during the guest command handling. */
> + resp_page = snp_alloc_firmware_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> + if (!resp_page)
> + goto e_free;
>
> data.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(context);
> rc = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_GCTX_CREATE, &data, &argp->error);
> - if (rc) {
> - snp_free_firmware_page(context);
> - return NULL;
> - }
> + if (rc)
> + goto e_free;
> +
> + sev->snp_certs_data = certs_data;
>
> return context;
> +
> +e_free:
> + snp_free_firmware_page(context);
> + kfree(certs_data);
> + return NULL;
> }
>
> static int snp_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, int *error)
> @@ -2248,6 +2266,8 @@ static int snp_decommission_context(struct kvm *kvm)
> snp_free_firmware_page(sev->snp_context);
> sev->snp_context = NULL;
>
> + kfree(sev->snp_certs_data);
> +
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -2746,6 +2766,8 @@ static int sev_es_validate_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 *exit_code)
> case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
> case SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES:
> case SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC:
> + case SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST:
> + case SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST:
> break;
> default:
> goto vmgexit_err;
> @@ -3161,6 +3183,155 @@ static unsigned long snp_handle_page_state_change(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> return rc ? map_to_psc_vmgexit_code(rc) : 0;
> }
>
> +static unsigned long snp_setup_guest_buf(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
> + struct sev_data_snp_guest_request *data,
> + gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
> +{
> + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
> + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
> + kvm_pfn_t req_pfn, resp_pfn;
> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
> +
> + sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +
> + if (!IS_ALIGNED(req_gpa, PAGE_SIZE) || !IS_ALIGNED(resp_gpa, PAGE_SIZE))
> + return SEV_RET_INVALID_PARAM;
> +
> + req_pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(req_gpa));
> + if (is_error_noslot_pfn(req_pfn))
> + return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
> +
> + resp_pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(resp_gpa));
> + if (is_error_noslot_pfn(resp_pfn))
> + return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
> +
> + if (rmp_make_private(resp_pfn, 0, PG_LEVEL_4K, 0, true))
> + return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
> +
> + data->gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context);
> + data->req_paddr = __sme_set(req_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
> + data->res_paddr = __sme_set(resp_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void snp_cleanup_guest_buf(struct sev_data_snp_guest_request *data, unsigned long *rc)
> +{
> + u64 pfn = __sme_clr(data->res_paddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = snp_page_reclaim(pfn);
> + if (ret)
> + *rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
> +
> + ret = rmp_make_shared(pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
> + if (ret)
> + *rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
> +}
> +
> +static void snp_handle_guest_request(struct vcpu_svm *svm, gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
> +{
> + struct sev_data_snp_guest_request data = {0};
> + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
> + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
> + unsigned long rc;
> + int err;
> +
> + if (!sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
> + rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST;
> + goto e_fail;
> + }
> +
> + sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
> +
> + rc = snp_setup_guest_buf(svm, &data, req_gpa, resp_gpa);
> + if (rc)
> + goto unlock;
> +
> + rc = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SNP_GUEST_REQUEST, &data, &err);
> + if (rc)
> + /* use the firmware error code */
> + rc = err;
> +
> + snp_cleanup_guest_buf(&data, &rc);
> +
> +unlock:
> + mutex_unlock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
> +
> +e_fail:
> + svm_set_ghcb_sw_exit_info_2(vcpu, rc);
> +}
> +
> +static void snp_handle_ext_guest_request(struct vcpu_svm *svm, gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
> +{
> + struct sev_data_snp_guest_request req = {0};
> + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
> + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
> + unsigned long data_npages;
> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
> + unsigned long rc, err;
> + u64 data_gpa;
> +
> + if (!sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
> + rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST;
> + goto e_fail;
> + }
> +
> + sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +
> + data_gpa = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
> + data_npages = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
> +
> + if (!IS_ALIGNED(data_gpa, PAGE_SIZE)) {
> + rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
> + goto e_fail;
> + }
> +
> + /* Verify that requested blob will fit in certificate buffer */
> + if ((data_npages << PAGE_SHIFT) > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) {
> + rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_PARAM;
> + goto e_fail;
> + }
> +
> + mutex_lock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
> +
> + rc = snp_setup_guest_buf(svm, &req, req_gpa, resp_gpa);
> + if (rc)
> + goto unlock;
> +
> + rc = snp_guest_ext_guest_request(&req, (unsigned long)sev->snp_certs_data,
> + &data_npages, &err);
> + if (rc) {
> + /*
> + * If buffer length is small then return the expected
> + * length in rbx.
> + */
> + if (err == SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN)
> + vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX] = data_npages;
> +
> + /* pass the firmware error code */
> + rc = err;
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> + /* Copy the certificate blob in the guest memory */
> + if (data_npages &&
> + kvm_write_guest(kvm, data_gpa, sev->snp_certs_data, data_npages << PAGE_SHIFT))
> + rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
> +
> +cleanup:
> + snp_cleanup_guest_buf(&req, &rc);
> +
> +unlock:
> + mutex_unlock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
> +
> +e_fail:
> + svm_set_ghcb_sw_exit_info_2(vcpu, rc);
> +}
> +
> static int sev_handle_vmgexit_msr_protocol(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> {
> struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
> @@ -3404,6 +3575,20 @@ int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> svm_set_ghcb_sw_exit_info_2(vcpu, rc);
> break;
> }
> + case SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST: {
> + snp_handle_guest_request(svm, control->exit_info_1, control->exit_info_2);
> +
> + ret = 1;
> + break;
> + }
> + case SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST: {
> + snp_handle_ext_guest_request(svm,
> + control->exit_info_1,
> + control->exit_info_2);
> +
> + ret = 1;
> + break;
> + }
Don't we need some sort of rate limiting here? Since the PSP is a
shared resource that the host needs access to as well as other guests
it seems a little dangerous to let the guest spam this interface.
> case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
> vcpu_unimpl(vcpu,
> "vmgexit: unsupported event - exit_info_1=%#llx, exit_info_2=%#llx\n",
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index 280072995306..71fe46a778f3 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ struct kvm_sev_info {
> u64 snp_init_flags;
> void *snp_context; /* SNP guest context page */
> struct srcu_struct psc_srcu;
> + void *snp_certs_data;
> + struct mutex guest_req_lock;
> };
>
> struct kvm_svm {
> --
> 2.17.1
>
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