linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 1/6] driver core: Move the "authorized" attribute from USB/Thunderbolt to core

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CA+CmpXtXn5wjxwow5va5u9qHcQDLkd4Sh2dcqB545SXaxV1GkQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 30 Sep 2021 14:19:47 +0300
From:   Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkelshb@...il.com>
To:     Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 
        <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, x86@...nel.org,
        Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@...gle.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@...il.com>,
        "Michael S . Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
        Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@...el.com>,
        "Rafael J . Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>,
        Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <knsathya@...nel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux PCI <linux-pci@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-usb@...r.kernel.org,
        virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/6] driver core: Move the "authorized" attribute from
 USB/Thunderbolt to core

On Thu, Sep 30, 2021 at 4:05 AM Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> no functional
> changes other than value 2 being not visible to the user.
>

Are we sure we don't break any user-facing tool with it? Tools might use this to
"remember" how the device was authorized this time.