| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <CACT4Y+Zx77Oe8TOuFvXcqLPg-GKf9VqUoq_e72rvtJgh+cCS4g@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 2021 19:10:20 +0200
From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
Cc: Lee Jones <lee.jones@...aro.org>, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
syzbot <syzbot+84fe685c02cd112a2ac3@...kaller.appspotmail.com>,
bp@...en8.de, hpa@...or.com, inglorion@...gle.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, mingo@...hat.com,
syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com, tglx@...utronix.de,
x86@...nel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, tkjos@...gle.com
Subject: Re: [syzbot] KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds Read in profile_pc
On Mon, 11 Oct 2021 at 16:43, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, 11 Oct 2021 14:07:15 +0100
> Lee Jones <lee.jones@...aro.org> wrote:
>
> > On Thu, 03 Jun 2021, Andi Kleen wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > > True, ftrace does have function profiling (function_profile_enabled).
> > > >
> > > > Steve, is there a way to enable that on the kernel cmdline?
> > >
> > > That's not really comparable. function profiling has a lot more overhead.
> > > Also there is various code which has ftrace instrumentation disabled.
> > >
> > > I don't think why you want to kill the old profiler. It's rarely used, but
> > > when you need it usually works. It's always good to have simple fall backs.
> > > And it's not that it's a lot of difficult code.
> >
> > sysbot is still sending out reports on this:
> >
> > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=00c965d957410afc0d40cac5343064e0a98b9ecd
> >
> > Are you guys still planning on sending out a fix?
> >
> > Is there anything I can do to help?
> >
>
> According to the above:
>
> ==================================================================
> BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in profile_pc+0xa4/0xe0 arch/x86/kernel/time.c:42
> Read of size 8 at addr ffffc90001c0f7a0 by task systemd-udevd/12323
>
> CPU: 1 PID: 12323 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.13.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
> Call Trace:
> <IRQ>
> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
> dump_stack+0x202/0x31e lib/dump_stack.c:120
> print_address_description+0x5f/0x3b0 mm/kasan/report.c:233
> __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:419 [inline]
> kasan_report+0x15c/0x200 mm/kasan/report.c:436
> profile_pc+0xa4/0xe0 arch/x86/kernel/time.c:42
> profile_tick+0xcd/0x120 kernel/profile.c:408
> tick_sched_handle kernel/time/tick-sched.c:227 [inline]
> tick_sched_timer+0x287/0x420 kernel/time/tick-sched.c:1373
> __run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1537 [inline]
> __hrtimer_run_queues+0x4cb/0xa60 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1601
> hrtimer_interrupt+0x3b3/0x1040 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1663
> local_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1089 [inline]
> __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xf9/0x270 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1106
> sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8c/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1100
>
> And the code has:
>
> profile_pc+0xa4/0xe0 arch/x86/kernel/time.c:42
>
> unsigned long profile_pc(struct pt_regs *regs)
> {
> unsigned long pc = instruction_pointer(regs);
>
> if (!user_mode(regs) && in_lock_functions(pc)) {
> #ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
> return *(unsigned long *)(regs->bp + sizeof(long));
> #else
> unsigned long *sp = (unsigned long *)regs->sp;
> /*
> * Return address is either directly at stack pointer
> * or above a saved flags. Eflags has bits 22-31 zero,
> * kernel addresses don't.
> */
> if (sp[0] >> 22)
> return sp[0]; <== line 42
> if (sp[1] >> 22)
> return sp[1];
> #endif
> }
> return pc;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(profile_pc);
>
>
> It looks to me that the profiler is doing a trick to read the contents of
> the stack when the interrupt went off, but this triggers the KASAN
> instrumentation to think it's a mistake when it's not. aka "false positive".
>
> How does one tell KASAN that it wants to go outside the stack, because it
> knows what its doing?
>
> Should that just be converted to a "copy_from_kernel_nofault()"? That is,
> does this fix it? (not even compiled tested)
>
> -- Steve
>
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/time.c b/arch/x86/kernel/time.c
> index e42faa792c07..cc6ec29aa14d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/time.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/time.c
> @@ -34,15 +34,18 @@ unsigned long profile_pc(struct pt_regs *regs)
> return *(unsigned long *)(regs->bp + sizeof(long));
> #else
> unsigned long *sp = (unsigned long *)regs->sp;
> + unsigned long retaddr;
> /*
> * Return address is either directly at stack pointer
> * or above a saved flags. Eflags has bits 22-31 zero,
> * kernel addresses don't.
> */
> - if (sp[0] >> 22)
> - return sp[0];
> - if (sp[1] >> 22)
> - return sp[1];
> + if (!copy_from_kernel_nofault(&retaddr, sp, sizeof(long)) &&
> + retaddr >> 22)
> + return retaddr;
> + if (!copy_from_kernel_nofault(&retaddr, sp + 1, sizeof(long)) &&
> + retaddr >> 22)
> + return retaddr;
> #endif
> }
> return pc;
This looks like a fit for READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(). It's already used in a
number of similar places like unwinders:
E.g.:
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.15-rc4/source/arch/x86/kernel/process.c#L984
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.15-rc4/A/ident/READ_ONCE_NOCHECK
Powered by blists - more mailing lists