linux-kernel - [PATCH] sctp: initialize endpoint LSM labels also on the client side

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Message-Id: <20211021153846.745289-1-omosnace@redhat.com>
Date:   Thu, 21 Oct 2021 17:38:46 +0200
From:   Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>
To:     Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@...il.com>,
        Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>,
        Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@...il.com>
Cc:     linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        selinux@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@...nternet.com>
Subject: [PATCH] sctp: initialize endpoint LSM labels also on the client side

The secid* fields in struct sctp_endpoint are used to initialize the
labels of a peeloff socket created from the given association. Currently
they are initialized properly when a new association is created on the
server side (upon receiving an INIT packet), but not on the client side.

As a result, when the client obtains a peeloff socket via
sctp_peeloff(3) under SELinux, it ends up unlabeled, leading to
unexpected denials.

Fix this by calling the security_sctp_assoc_request() hook also upon
receiving a valid INIT-ACK response from the server, so that the
endpoint labels are properly initialized also on the client side.

Fixes: 2277c7cd75e3 ("sctp: Add LSM hooks")
Cc: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@...nternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>
---
 include/net/sctp/structs.h | 11 ++++++-----
 net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c    |  5 +++++
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
index 651bba654d77..033a955592dd 100644
--- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h
+++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
@@ -1356,11 +1356,12 @@ struct sctp_endpoint {
 
 	__u8  strreset_enable;
 
-	/* Security identifiers from incoming (INIT). These are set by
-	 * security_sctp_assoc_request(). These will only be used by
-	 * SCTP TCP type sockets and peeled off connections as they
-	 * cause a new socket to be generated. security_sctp_sk_clone()
-	 * will then plug these into the new socket.
+	/* Security identifiers from incoming (INIT/INIT-ACK). These
+	 * are set by security_sctp_assoc_request(). These will only
+	 * be used by SCTP TCP type sockets and peeled off connections
+	 * as they cause a new socket to be generated.
+	 * security_sctp_sk_clone() will then plug these into the new
+	 * socket.
 	 */
 
 	u32 secid;
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index 32df65f68c12..cb291c7f5fb7 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -521,6 +521,11 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net,
 	if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc))
 		return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
 
+	/* Update socket peer label if first association. */
+	if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint *)ep,
+					chunk->skb))
+		return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
 	/* 6.10 Bundling
 	 * An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK or
 	 * SHUTDOWN COMPLETE with any other chunks.
-- 
2.31.1