linux-kernel - [PATCH for-rc v2] RDMA/cma: Remove open coding of overflow checking for private_data

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Message-Id: <1637661978-18770-1-git-send-email-haakon.bugge@oracle.com>
Date:   Tue, 23 Nov 2021 11:06:18 +0100
From:   Håkon Bugge <haakon.bugge@...cle.com>
To:     Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>
Cc:     Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org>, linux-rdma@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH for-rc v2] RDMA/cma: Remove open coding of overflow checking for private_data_len

The existing tests are a little hard to comprehend. Use
check_add_overflow() instead.

Fixes: 04ded1672402 ("RDMA/cma: Verify private data length")
Signed-off-by: Håkon Bugge <haakon.bugge@...cle.com>

---

v1 -> v2:

   * Also fixed same issue in cma_resolve_ib_udp() as pointed out
     by Leon
---
 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c | 6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c
index 835ac54..8a98aa9 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c
@@ -4033,8 +4033,7 @@ static int cma_resolve_ib_udp(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv,
 
 	memset(&req, 0, sizeof req);
 	offset = cma_user_data_offset(id_priv);
-	req.private_data_len = offset + conn_param->private_data_len;
-	if (req.private_data_len < conn_param->private_data_len)
+	if (check_add_overflow(offset, conn_param->private_data_len, &req.private_data_len))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (req.private_data_len) {
@@ -4093,8 +4092,7 @@ static int cma_connect_ib(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv,
 
 	memset(&req, 0, sizeof req);
 	offset = cma_user_data_offset(id_priv);
-	req.private_data_len = offset + conn_param->private_data_len;
-	if (req.private_data_len < conn_param->private_data_len)
+	if (check_add_overflow(offset, conn_param->private_data_len, &req.private_data_len))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (req.private_data_len) {
-- 
1.8.3.1