linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] x86/sme: Explicitly map new EFI memmap table as encrypted

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Message-ID: <CAMj1kXHKxObuebZJMWQQwg014rYzvoBgWPZxfCYakuf+GSoqhg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 3 Dec 2021 11:30:38 +0100
From:   Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
To:     Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc:     Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        linux-efi <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
        platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Darren Hart <dvhart@...radead.org>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andy@...radead.org>,
        Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
        "# 3.4.x" <stable@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/sme: Explicitly map new EFI memmap table as encrypted

On Wed, 1 Dec 2021 at 15:06, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com> wrote:
>
> On 10/27/21 12:04 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 10/27/21 11:59 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> On Wed, 27 Oct 2021 at 18:56, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On Wed, Oct 27, 2021 at 05:14:35PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >>>> I could take it, but since it will ultimately go through -tip anyway,
> >>>> perhaps better if they just take it directly? (This will change after
> >>>> the next -rc1 though)
> >>>>
> >>>> Boris?
> >>>
> >>> Yeah, I'm being told this is not urgent enough to rush in now so you
> >>> could queue it into your fixes branch for 5.16 once -rc1 is out and send
> >>> it to Linus then. The stable tag is just so it gets backported to the
> >>> respective trees.
> >>>
> >>> But if you prefer I should take it, then I can queue it after -rc1.
> >>> It'll boil down to the same thing though.
> >>>
> >>
> >> No, in that case, I can take it myself.
> >>
> >> Tom, does that work for you?
> >
> > Yup, that works for me. Thanks guys!
>
> I don't see this in any tree yet, so just a gentle reminder in case it
> dropped off the radar.
>

Apologies for the delay, I've pushed this out to -next now.

Before I send it to Linus, can you please confirm (for my peace of
mind) how this only affects systems that have memory encryption
available and enabled in the first place?