linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] x86/sme: Explicitly map new EFI memmap table as encrypted

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Message-ID: <6d6b4982-ce69-4fd4-1bb8-5c35b360a95f@amd.com>
Date:   Fri, 3 Dec 2021 10:22:06 -0600
From:   Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To:     Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Cc:     Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        linux-efi <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
        platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Darren Hart <dvhart@...radead.org>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andy@...radead.org>,
        Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
        "# 3.4.x" <stable@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/sme: Explicitly map new EFI memmap table as
 encrypted

On 12/3/21 4:30 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Wed, 1 Dec 2021 at 15:06, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com> wrote:
>>
>> On 10/27/21 12:04 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/27/21 11:59 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>>>> On Wed, 27 Oct 2021 at 18:56, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Oct 27, 2021 at 05:14:35PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>>>>>> I could take it, but since it will ultimately go through -tip anyway,
>>>>>> perhaps better if they just take it directly? (This will change after
>>>>>> the next -rc1 though)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Boris?
>>>>>
>>>>> Yeah, I'm being told this is not urgent enough to rush in now so you
>>>>> could queue it into your fixes branch for 5.16 once -rc1 is out and send
>>>>> it to Linus then. The stable tag is just so it gets backported to the
>>>>> respective trees.
>>>>>
>>>>> But if you prefer I should take it, then I can queue it after -rc1.
>>>>> It'll boil down to the same thing though.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> No, in that case, I can take it myself.
>>>>
>>>> Tom, does that work for you?
>>>
>>> Yup, that works for me. Thanks guys!
>>
>> I don't see this in any tree yet, so just a gentle reminder in case it
>> dropped off the radar.
>>
> 
> Apologies for the delay, I've pushed this out to -next now.
> 
> Before I send it to Linus, can you please confirm (for my peace of
> mind) how this only affects systems that have memory encryption
> available and enabled in the first place?

Certainly.

An early_memremap() call uses the FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL protection value for 
performing the mapping. Prior to performing the actual mapping though, a 
call to early_memremap_pgprot_adjust() is made to possibly alter the 
protection value, but only if memory encryption is active.

Changing the call to early_memremap_prot() and providing 
pgprot_encrypted(FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL) as the protection value results in an 
equivalent call to early_memremap() when memory encryption is not active. 
This is because the pgprot_encrypted() is, in effect, a NOP when memory 
encryption is not active.

So when memory encryption is not available or active, the result of an 
early_memremap_prot() call with a protection value of 
pgprot_encrypted(FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL) is equivalent to an early_memremap() 
call.

Let me know if that answers your question.

Thanks,
Tom

>