[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <7cc68f5519a218da54560bffe76d2d88c3573def.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 06 Dec 2021 11:25:08 -0500
From: James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, zohar@...ux.ibm.com,
serge@...lyn.com, containers@...ts.linux.dev,
dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com, ebiederm@...ssion.com,
krzysztof.struczynski@...wei.com, roberto.sassu@...wei.com,
mpeters@...hat.com, lhinds@...hat.com, lsturman@...hat.com,
puiterwi@...hat.com, jamjoom@...ibm.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, paul@...l-moore.com, rgb@...hat.com,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...ei.org
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 19/19] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace
On Mon, 2021-12-06 at 16:44 +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 06, 2021 at 08:38:29AM -0500, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Mon, 2021-12-06 at 13:08 +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
[...]
> > > Instead subsequents mounts resurface the same superblock. There
> > > might be an inherent design reason why this needs to be this way
> > > but I would advise against these semantics for anything that
> > > wants to be namespaced. Probably the first securityfs mount in
> > > init_user_ns can follow these semantics but ones tied to a non-
> > > initial user namespace should not as the userns can go away. In
> > > that case the pinning logic seems strange as conceptually the
> > > userns pins the securityfs mount as evidenced by the fact that we
> > > key by it in get_tree_keyed().
> >
> > Yes, that's basically what I did: pin if ns == &init_user_ns but
> > don't pin if not. However, I'm still not sure I got the triggers
> > right. We have to trigger the notifier call (which adds the
> > namespaced file entries) from context free, because that's the
> > first place the superblock mount is fully set up ... I can't do it
> > in fill_super because the mount isn't fully initialized (and the
> > locking prevents it). I did manage to get the notifier for
> > teardown triggered from kill_super, though.
>
> I don't think you need a vfsmount at all to be honest. I think this
> can all be done without much ceremony. Here's a brutalist completely
> untested patch outlining one approach:
This is what I did (incremental to Stefan's series + my previous
patch): it avoids superblock threading by switching to a root dentry in
the securityfs user namespace area ... or am I being too simple again
... ?
I'm still a bit unhappy about triggering a blocking notifier under the
umount semaphore ...
James
---
diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
index 6b8bd060d8c4..03a0879376a0 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
@@ -104,8 +104,7 @@ struct user_namespace {
struct ima_namespace *ima_ns;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS
- struct vfsmount *securityfs_mount;
- bool securityfs_notifier_sent;
+ struct dentry *securityfs_root;
#endif
} __randomize_layout;
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index 62ab4630dc31..863fccfd3687 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
+static struct vfsmount *securityfs_mount;
static int securityfs_mount_count;
static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(securityfs_ns_notifier);
@@ -41,42 +42,22 @@ static const struct super_operations securityfs_super_operations = {
.free_inode = securityfs_free_inode,
};
-static struct file_system_type fs_type;
-
-static void securityfs_free_context(struct fs_context *fc)
-{
- struct user_namespace *ns = fc->user_ns;
- if (ns == &init_user_ns ||
- ns->securityfs_notifier_sent)
- return;
-
- ns->securityfs_notifier_sent = true;
-
- ns->securityfs_mount = vfs_kern_mount(&fs_type, SB_KERNMOUNT,
- fs_type.name, NULL);
- if (IS_ERR(ns->securityfs_mount)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "kern mount on securityfs ERROR: %ld\n",
- PTR_ERR(ns->securityfs_mount));
- ns->securityfs_mount = NULL;
- return;
- }
-
- blocking_notifier_call_chain(&securityfs_ns_notifier,
- SECURITYFS_NS_ADD, fc->user_ns);
- mntput(ns->securityfs_mount);
-}
-
static int securityfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
{
static const struct tree_descr files[] = {{""}};
int error;
+ struct user_namespace *ns = fc->user_ns;
error = simple_fill_super(sb, SECURITYFS_MAGIC, files);
if (error)
return error;
+ ns->securityfs_root = sb->s_root;
+
sb->s_op = &securityfs_super_operations;
+ blocking_notifier_call_chain(&securityfs_ns_notifier,
+ SECURITYFS_NS_ADD, ns);
return 0;
}
@@ -87,7 +68,6 @@ static int securityfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
static const struct fs_context_operations securityfs_context_ops = {
.get_tree = securityfs_get_tree,
- .free = securityfs_free_context,
};
static int securityfs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
@@ -104,8 +84,7 @@ static void securityfs_kill_super(struct super_block *sb)
blocking_notifier_call_chain(&securityfs_ns_notifier,
SECURITYFS_NS_REMOVE,
sb->s_fs_info);
- ns->securityfs_notifier_sent = false;
- ns->securityfs_mount = NULL;
+ ns->securityfs_root = NULL;
kill_litter_super(sb);
}
@@ -179,14 +158,18 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode,
pr_debug("securityfs: creating file '%s', ns=%u\n",name, ns->ns.inum);
if (ns == &init_user_ns) {
- error = simple_pin_fs(&fs_type, &ns->securityfs_mount,
+ error = simple_pin_fs(&fs_type, &securityfs_mount,
&securityfs_mount_count);
if (error)
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
- if (!parent)
- parent = ns->securityfs_mount->mnt_root;
+ if (!parent) {
+ if (ns == &init_user_ns)
+ parent = securityfs_mount->mnt_root;
+ else
+ parent = ns->securityfs_root;
+ }
dir = d_inode(parent);
@@ -232,7 +215,7 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode,
out:
inode_unlock(dir);
if (ns == &init_user_ns)
- simple_release_fs(&ns->securityfs_mount,
+ simple_release_fs(&securityfs_mount,
&securityfs_mount_count);
return dentry;
}
@@ -376,7 +359,7 @@ void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
}
inode_unlock(dir);
if (ns == &init_user_ns)
- simple_release_fs(&ns->securityfs_mount,
+ simple_release_fs(&securityfs_mount,
&securityfs_mount_count);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(securityfs_remove);
@@ -405,8 +388,6 @@ static int __init securityfs_init(void)
if (retval)
return retval;
- init_user_ns.securityfs_mount = NULL;
-
retval = register_filesystem(&fs_type);
if (retval) {
sysfs_remove_mount_point(kernel_kobj, "security");
Powered by blists - more mailing lists