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Message-ID: <20211208125814.hdaghdq7yk5wvvor@wittgenstein>
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 13:58:14 +0100
From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>
To: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, zohar@...ux.ibm.com,
serge@...lyn.com, containers@...ts.linux.dev,
dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com, ebiederm@...ssion.com,
krzysztof.struczynski@...wei.com, roberto.sassu@...wei.com,
mpeters@...hat.com, lhinds@...hat.com, lsturman@...hat.com,
puiterwi@...hat.com, jejb@...ux.ibm.com, jamjoom@...ibm.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, paul@...l-moore.com, rgb@...hat.com,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 16/16] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace
On Tue, Dec 07, 2021 at 03:21:27PM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
> Setup securityfs with symlinks, directories, and files for IMA
> namespacing support. The same directory structure that IMA uses on the
> host is also created for the namespacing case.
>
> The securityfs file and directory ownerships cannot be set when the
> IMA namespace is initialized. Therefore, delay the setup of the file
> system to a later point when securityfs is in securityfs_fill_super.
>
> This filesystem can now be mounted as follows:
>
> mount -t securityfs /sys/kernel/security/ /sys/kernel/security/
>
> The following directories, symlinks, and files are then available.
>
> $ ls -l sys/kernel/security/
> total 0
> lr--r--r--. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 ima -> integrity/ima
> drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 integrity
>
> $ ls -l sys/kernel/security/ima/
> total 0
> -r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 ascii_runtime_measurements
> -r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 binary_runtime_measurements
> -rw-------. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 policy
> -r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 runtime_measurements_count
> -r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 violations
>
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>
> ---
> include/linux/ima.h | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
> security/inode.c | 12 +++++++++++-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
> 3 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> index bfb978a7f8d5..a8017272d78d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
> }
> #endif
>
> +extern int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
> + struct dentry *root);
> +extern void ima_fs_ns_free_dentries(struct user_namespace *user_ns);
> +
> #else
> static inline enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void)
> {
> @@ -154,6 +158,15 @@ static inline int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
> return -ENOENT;
> }
>
> +static inline int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *ns, struct dentry *root)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void ima_fs_ns_free_dentries(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
> +{
> +}
> +
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
>
> #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
> @@ -221,7 +234,8 @@ struct ima_h_table {
> };
>
> enum {
> - IMAFS_DENTRY_DIR = 0,
> + IMAFS_DENTRY_INTEGRITY_DIR = 0,
> + IMAFS_DENTRY_DIR,
> IMAFS_DENTRY_SYMLINK,
> IMAFS_DENTRY_BINARY_RUNTIME_MEASUREMENTS,
> IMAFS_DENTRY_ASCII_RUNTIME_MEASUREMENTS,
> @@ -333,6 +347,7 @@ static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
> {
> return &init_ima_ns;
> }
> +
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
>
> #if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
> diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
> index 121ac1874dde..10ee20917f42 100644
> --- a/security/inode.c
> +++ b/security/inode.c
> @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
> #include <linux/fs_context.h>
> #include <linux/mount.h>
> #include <linux/pagemap.h>
> +#include <linux/ima.h>
> #include <linux/init.h>
> #include <linux/namei.h>
> #include <linux/security.h>
> @@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ static const struct super_operations securityfs_super_operations = {
> static int securityfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
> {
> static const struct tree_descr files[] = {{""}};
> + struct user_namespace *ns = fc->user_ns;
> int error;
>
> error = simple_fill_super(sb, SECURITYFS_MAGIC, files);
> @@ -49,7 +51,10 @@ static int securityfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
>
> sb->s_op = &securityfs_super_operations;
>
> - return 0;
> + if (ns != &init_user_ns)
> + error = ima_fs_ns_init(ns, sb->s_root);
> +
> + return error;
> }
>
> static int securityfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
> @@ -69,6 +74,11 @@ static int securityfs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
>
> static void securityfs_kill_super(struct super_block *sb)
> {
> + struct user_namespace *ns = sb->s_fs_info;
> +
> + if (ns != &init_user_ns)
> + ima_fs_ns_free_dentries(ns);
Say securityfs is unmounted. Then all the inodes and dentries become
invalid. It's not allowed to hold on to any dentries or inodes after the
super_block is shut down. So I just want to be sure that nothing in ima
can access these dentries after securityfs is unmounted.
To put it another way: why are they stored in struct ima_namespace in
the first place? If you don't pin a filesystem when creating files or
directories like you do for securityfs in init_ima_ns then you don't
need to hold on to them as they will be automatically be wiped during
umount.
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