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Message-ID: <20211208131656.ozsbbotttvz3bct7@wittgenstein>
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 14:16:56 +0100
From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>
To: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, zohar@...ux.ibm.com,
serge@...lyn.com, containers@...ts.linux.dev,
dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com, ebiederm@...ssion.com,
krzysztof.struczynski@...wei.com, roberto.sassu@...wei.com,
mpeters@...hat.com, lhinds@...hat.com, lsturman@...hat.com,
puiterwi@...hat.com, jejb@...ux.ibm.com, jamjoom@...ibm.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, paul@...l-moore.com, rgb@...hat.com,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 16/16] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace
On Wed, Dec 08, 2021 at 01:58:14PM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 07, 2021 at 03:21:27PM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > Setup securityfs with symlinks, directories, and files for IMA
> > namespacing support. The same directory structure that IMA uses on the
> > host is also created for the namespacing case.
> >
> > The securityfs file and directory ownerships cannot be set when the
> > IMA namespace is initialized. Therefore, delay the setup of the file
> > system to a later point when securityfs is in securityfs_fill_super.
> >
> > This filesystem can now be mounted as follows:
> >
> > mount -t securityfs /sys/kernel/security/ /sys/kernel/security/
> >
> > The following directories, symlinks, and files are then available.
> >
> > $ ls -l sys/kernel/security/
> > total 0
> > lr--r--r--. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 ima -> integrity/ima
> > drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 integrity
> >
> > $ ls -l sys/kernel/security/ima/
> > total 0
> > -r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 ascii_runtime_measurements
> > -r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 binary_runtime_measurements
> > -rw-------. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 policy
> > -r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 runtime_measurements_count
> > -r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Dec 2 00:18 violations
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
> > Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>
> > ---
> > include/linux/ima.h | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
> > security/inode.c | 12 +++++++++++-
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
> > 3 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> > index bfb978a7f8d5..a8017272d78d 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> > @@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
> > }
> > #endif
> >
> > +extern int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
> > + struct dentry *root);
> > +extern void ima_fs_ns_free_dentries(struct user_namespace *user_ns);
> > +
> > #else
> > static inline enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void)
> > {
> > @@ -154,6 +158,15 @@ static inline int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
> > return -ENOENT;
> > }
> >
> > +static inline int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *ns, struct dentry *root)
> > +{
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static inline void ima_fs_ns_free_dentries(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
> > +{
> > +}
> > +
> > #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
> >
> > #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
> > @@ -221,7 +234,8 @@ struct ima_h_table {
> > };
> >
> > enum {
> > - IMAFS_DENTRY_DIR = 0,
> > + IMAFS_DENTRY_INTEGRITY_DIR = 0,
> > + IMAFS_DENTRY_DIR,
> > IMAFS_DENTRY_SYMLINK,
> > IMAFS_DENTRY_BINARY_RUNTIME_MEASUREMENTS,
> > IMAFS_DENTRY_ASCII_RUNTIME_MEASUREMENTS,
> > @@ -333,6 +347,7 @@ static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
> > {
> > return &init_ima_ns;
> > }
> > +
> > #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
> >
> > #if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
> > diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
> > index 121ac1874dde..10ee20917f42 100644
> > --- a/security/inode.c
> > +++ b/security/inode.c
> > @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
> > #include <linux/fs_context.h>
> > #include <linux/mount.h>
> > #include <linux/pagemap.h>
> > +#include <linux/ima.h>
> > #include <linux/init.h>
> > #include <linux/namei.h>
> > #include <linux/security.h>
> > @@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ static const struct super_operations securityfs_super_operations = {
> > static int securityfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
> > {
> > static const struct tree_descr files[] = {{""}};
> > + struct user_namespace *ns = fc->user_ns;
> > int error;
> >
> > error = simple_fill_super(sb, SECURITYFS_MAGIC, files);
> > @@ -49,7 +51,10 @@ static int securityfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
> >
> > sb->s_op = &securityfs_super_operations;
> >
> > - return 0;
> > + if (ns != &init_user_ns)
> > + error = ima_fs_ns_init(ns, sb->s_root);
> > +
> > + return error;
> > }
> >
> > static int securityfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
> > @@ -69,6 +74,11 @@ static int securityfs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
> >
> > static void securityfs_kill_super(struct super_block *sb)
> > {
> > + struct user_namespace *ns = sb->s_fs_info;
> > +
> > + if (ns != &init_user_ns)
> > + ima_fs_ns_free_dentries(ns);
>
> Say securityfs is unmounted. Then all the inodes and dentries become
> invalid. It's not allowed to hold on to any dentries or inodes after the
> super_block is shut down. So I just want to be sure that nothing in ima
> can access these dentries after securityfs is unmounted.
>
> To put it another way: why are they stored in struct ima_namespace in
> the first place? If you don't pin a filesystem when creating files or
> directories like you do for securityfs in init_ima_ns then you don't
> need to hold on to them as they will be automatically be wiped during
> umount.
The way I see it you need to do the following:
If securityfs is mounted in a userns and fill_super is called you need
to call
int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
(which you really should call ima_securitfs_init()...)
and when you create those entries for non-init-securityfs you just need
sm like:
struct dentry *dentry;
/* XXXX useless comment XXXX:
* The lookup_one_len() function will always return with an
* increased refcount on the dentry that you need to release.
*/
dentry = lookup_one_len(name, parent, strlen(name));
if (IS_ERR(dentry))
return dentry;
/* Return error if the file/dir already exists. */
if (d_really_is_positive(dentry)) {
/*
* XXXX useless comment XXXX:
* Put the reference from lookup_one_len()
*/
dput(dentry);
return ERR_PTR(-EEXIST);
}
inode = new_inode(dir->i_sb);
if (!inode) {
error = -ENOMEM;
goto out1;
}
// DO A LOT OF OTHER STUFF
d_instantiate(dentry, new_inode);
// DON'T CALL dget() again
The point is to not increase the refcount again like
securityfs_create_dentry() does after d_instantiate which requires you
to call securityfs_remove(). That's unnecessary for the
non-init_user_ns-securityfs case and then you don't need all that
cleanup stuff in kill_super() and can just rely on d_genocide() and the
dcache shrinker to do all the required work.
Don't hold on to objects that can go away beneath you in any structs.
Stashing them in ima_namespace will just make people think that these
things can be accessed without any lifetime concerns which is imho an
invitation to disaster in the long run.
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