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Message-ID: <20211216171358.61140-9-michael.roth@amd.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2021 11:13:53 -0600
From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
To: <linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org>
CC: <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
<x86@...nel.org>, Nathan Tempelman <natet@...gle.com>,
Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>,
"Steve Rutherford" <srutherford@...gle.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@...gle.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Varad Gautam <varad.gautam@...e.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
"David Woodhouse" <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Ricardo Koller <ricarkol@...gle.com>,
"Jim Mattson" <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@...en8.de>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@...cle.com>,
Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 08/13] KVM: selftests: add SEV boot tests
A common aspect of booting SEV guests is checking related CPUID/MSR
bits and accessing shared/private memory. Add a basic test to cover
this.
This test will be expanded to cover basic boot of SEV-ES and SEV-SNP in
subsequent patches.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile | 1 +
.../selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c | 255 ++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 257 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore
index 4a801cba9c62..cc73de938a2a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
/x86_64/xen_vmcall_test
/x86_64/xss_msr_test
/x86_64/vmx_pmu_msrs_test
+/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test
/access_tracking_perf_test
/demand_paging_test
/dirty_log_test
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
index ccc382a827f1..6f250e190fde 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/xen_shinfo_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/xen_vmcall_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/vmx_pi_mmio_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/sev_migrate_tests
+TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/sev_all_boot_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += demand_paging_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += dirty_log_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += dirty_log_perf_test
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..329a740a7cb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Basic SEV boot tests.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices
+ */
+#define _GNU_SOURCE /* for program_invocation_short_name */
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+
+#include "test_util.h"
+
+#include "kvm_util.h"
+#include "processor.h"
+#include "svm_util.h"
+#include "linux/psp-sev.h"
+#include "sev.h"
+
+#define VCPU_ID 2
+#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
+#define PAGE_STRIDE 32
+
+#define SHARED_PAGES 8192
+#define SHARED_VADDR_MIN 0x1000000
+
+#define PRIVATE_PAGES 2048
+#define PRIVATE_VADDR_MIN (SHARED_VADDR_MIN + SHARED_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE)
+
+#define TOTAL_PAGES (512 + SHARED_PAGES + PRIVATE_PAGES)
+
+static void fill_buf(uint8_t *buf, size_t pages, size_t stride, uint8_t val)
+{
+ int i, j;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < pages; i++)
+ for (j = 0; j < PAGE_SIZE; j += stride)
+ buf[i * PAGE_SIZE + j] = val;
+}
+
+static bool check_buf(uint8_t *buf, size_t pages, size_t stride, uint8_t val)
+{
+ int i, j;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < pages; i++)
+ for (j = 0; j < PAGE_SIZE; j += stride)
+ if (buf[i * PAGE_SIZE + j] != val)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void guest_test_start(struct ucall *uc)
+{
+ /* Initial guest check-in. */
+ GUEST_SHARED_SYNC(uc, 1);
+}
+
+static void test_start(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct ucall *uc)
+{
+ vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
+
+ /* Initial guest check-in. */
+ CHECK_SHARED_SYNC(vm, VCPU_ID, uc, 1);
+}
+
+static void
+guest_test_common(struct ucall *uc, uint8_t *shared_buf, uint8_t *private_buf)
+{
+ bool success;
+
+ /* Initial check-in for common. */
+ GUEST_SHARED_SYNC(uc, 100);
+
+ /* Ensure initial shared pages are intact. */
+ success = check_buf(shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x41);
+ GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, success);
+
+ /* Ensure initial private pages are intact/encrypted. */
+ success = check_buf(private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x42);
+ GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, success);
+
+ /* Ensure host userspace can't read newly-written encrypted data. */
+ fill_buf(private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x43);
+
+ GUEST_SHARED_SYNC(uc, 101);
+
+ /* Ensure guest can read newly-written shared data from host. */
+ success = check_buf(shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x44);
+ GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, success);
+
+ /* Ensure host can read newly-written shared data from guest. */
+ fill_buf(shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x45);
+
+ GUEST_SHARED_SYNC(uc, 102);
+}
+
+static void
+test_common(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct ucall *uc,
+ uint8_t *shared_buf, uint8_t *private_buf)
+{
+ bool success;
+
+ /* Initial guest check-in. */
+ vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
+ CHECK_SHARED_SYNC(vm, VCPU_ID, uc, 100);
+
+ /* Ensure initial private pages are intact/encrypted. */
+ success = check_buf(private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x42);
+ TEST_ASSERT(!success, "Initial guest memory not encrypted!");
+
+ vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
+ CHECK_SHARED_SYNC(vm, VCPU_ID, uc, 101);
+
+ /* Ensure host userspace can't read newly-written encrypted data. */
+ success = check_buf(private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x43);
+ TEST_ASSERT(!success, "Modified guest memory not encrypted!");
+
+ /* Ensure guest can read newly-written shared data from host. */
+ fill_buf(shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x44);
+
+ vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
+ CHECK_SHARED_SYNC(vm, VCPU_ID, uc, 102);
+
+ /* Ensure host can read newly-written shared data from guest. */
+ success = check_buf(shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x45);
+ TEST_ASSERT(success, "Host can't read shared guest memory!");
+}
+
+static void
+guest_test_done(struct ucall *uc)
+{
+ GUEST_SHARED_DONE(uc);
+}
+
+static void
+test_done(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct ucall *uc)
+{
+ vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
+ CHECK_SHARED_DONE(vm, VCPU_ID, uc);
+}
+
+static void __attribute__((__flatten__))
+guest_sev_code(struct ucall *uc, uint8_t *shared_buf, uint8_t *private_buf)
+{
+ uint32_t eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+ uint64_t sev_status;
+
+ guest_test_start(uc);
+
+ /* Check SEV CPUID bit. */
+ eax = 0x8000001f;
+ ecx = 0;
+ cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, eax & (1 << 1));
+
+ /* Check SEV MSR bit. */
+ sev_status = rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV);
+ GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, (sev_status & 0x1) == 1);
+
+ guest_test_common(uc, shared_buf, private_buf);
+
+ guest_test_done(uc);
+}
+
+static struct sev_vm *
+setup_test_common(void *guest_code, uint64_t policy, struct ucall **uc,
+ uint8_t **shared_buf, uint8_t **private_buf)
+{
+ vm_vaddr_t uc_vaddr, shared_vaddr, private_vaddr;
+ uint8_t measurement[512];
+ struct sev_vm *sev;
+ struct kvm_vm *vm;
+ int i;
+
+ sev = sev_vm_create(policy, TOTAL_PAGES);
+ if (!sev)
+ return NULL;
+ vm = sev_get_vm(sev);
+
+ /* Set up VCPU and initial guest kernel. */
+ vm_vcpu_add_default(vm, VCPU_ID, guest_code);
+ kvm_vm_elf_load(vm, program_invocation_name);
+
+ /* Set up shared ucall buffer. */
+ uc_vaddr = ucall_shared_alloc(vm, 1);
+
+ /* Set up buffer for reserved shared memory. */
+ shared_vaddr = vm_vaddr_alloc_shared(vm, SHARED_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE,
+ SHARED_VADDR_MIN);
+ *shared_buf = addr_gva2hva(vm, shared_vaddr);
+ fill_buf(*shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x41);
+
+ /* Set up buffer for reserved private memory. */
+ private_vaddr = vm_vaddr_alloc(vm, PRIVATE_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE,
+ PRIVATE_VADDR_MIN);
+ *private_buf = addr_gva2hva(vm, private_vaddr);
+ fill_buf(*private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x42);
+
+ /* Set up guest params. */
+ vcpu_args_set(vm, VCPU_ID, 4, uc_vaddr, shared_vaddr, private_vaddr);
+
+ /*
+ * Hand these back to test harness, translation is needed now since page
+ * table will be encrypted after SEV VM launch.
+ */
+ *uc = addr_gva2hva(vm, uc_vaddr);
+ *shared_buf = addr_gva2hva(vm, shared_vaddr);
+ *private_buf = addr_gva2hva(vm, private_vaddr);
+
+ /* Allocations/setup done. Encrypt initial guest payload. */
+ sev_vm_launch(sev);
+
+ /* Dump the initial measurement. A test to actually verify it would be nice. */
+ sev_vm_launch_measure(sev, measurement);
+ pr_info("guest measurement: ");
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; ++i)
+ pr_info("%02x", measurement[i]);
+ pr_info("\n");
+
+ sev_vm_launch_finish(sev);
+
+ return sev;
+}
+
+static void test_sev(void *guest_code, uint64_t policy)
+{
+ uint8_t *shared_buf, *private_buf;
+ struct sev_vm *sev;
+ struct kvm_vm *vm;
+ struct ucall *uc;
+
+ sev = setup_test_common(guest_code, policy, &uc, &shared_buf, &private_buf);
+ if (!sev)
+ return;
+ vm = sev_get_vm(sev);
+
+ /* Guest is ready to run. Do the tests. */
+ test_start(vm, uc);
+ test_common(vm, uc, shared_buf, private_buf);
+ test_done(vm, uc);
+
+ sev_vm_free(sev);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ /* SEV tests */
+ test_sev(guest_sev_code, SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG);
+ test_sev(guest_sev_code, 0);
+
+ return 0;
+}
--
2.25.1
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