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Message-Id: <20211230171940.27558-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2021 18:19:40 +0100
From: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@...il.com>
To: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-janitors@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH] Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization
The config RANDOMIZE_SLAB does not exist, the authors probably intended to
refer to the config RANDOMIZE_BASE, which provides kernel address-space
randomization. They probably just confused SLAB with BASE (these two
four-letter words coincidentally share three common letters), as they also
point out the config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM as further randomization within
the same sentence.
Fix the reference of the config for kernel address-space randomization to
the config that provides that.
Fixes: 6e88559470f5 ("Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@...il.com>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index ab7d402c1677..a2b22d5640ec 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ Spectre variant 2
before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits
using the firmware.
- Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y
+ Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y
and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes
attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.
--
2.17.1
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