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Message-ID: <875yr0xwac.fsf@meer.lwn.net>
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2022 15:57:15 -0700
From: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
To: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@...il.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-janitors@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for
kernel address-space randomization
Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@...il.com> writes:
> The config RANDOMIZE_SLAB does not exist, the authors probably intended to
> refer to the config RANDOMIZE_BASE, which provides kernel address-space
> randomization. They probably just confused SLAB with BASE (these two
> four-letter words coincidentally share three common letters), as they also
> point out the config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM as further randomization within
> the same sentence.
>
> Fix the reference of the config for kernel address-space randomization to
> the config that provides that.
>
> Fixes: 6e88559470f5 ("Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre")
> Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@...il.com>
> ---
> Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
> index ab7d402c1677..a2b22d5640ec 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
> @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ Spectre variant 2
> before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits
> using the firmware.
>
> - Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y
> + Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y
> and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes
> attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.
Makes sense to me...applied, thanks.
jon
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