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Date:   Thu, 6 Jan 2022 14:40:00 +0530
From:   Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@....com>
To:     Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org
Cc:     Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@...aro.org>,
        coresight@...ts.linaro.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] coresight: trbe: Work around the invalid prohibited
 states



On 1/5/22 7:24 PM, Suzuki K Poulose wrote:
> On 05/01/2022 11:16, Anshuman Khandual wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 1/5/22 3:43 PM, Suzuki K Poulose wrote:
>>> Hi Anshuman
>>>
>>> On 05/01/2022 05:05, Anshuman Khandual wrote:
>>>> TRBE implementations affected by Arm erratum #2038923 might get TRBE into
>>>> an inconsistent view on whether trace is prohibited within the CPU. As a
>>>> result, the trace buffer or trace buffer state might be corrupted. This
>>>> happens after TRBE buffer has been enabled by setting TRBLIMITR_EL1.E,
>>>> followed by just a single context synchronization event before execution
>>>> changes from a context, in which trace is prohibited to one where it isn't,
>>>> or vice versa. In these mentioned conditions, the view of whether trace is
>>>> prohibited is inconsistent between parts of the CPU, and the trace buffer
>>>> or the trace buffer state might be corrupted.
>>>>
>>>> Work around this problem in the TRBE driver by preventing an inconsistent
>>>> view of whether the trace is prohibited or not based on TRBLIMITR_EL1.E by
>>>> immediately following a change to TRBLIMITR_EL1.E with at least one ISB
>>>> instruction before an ERET, or two ISB instructions if no ERET is to take
>>>> place. This adds a new cpu errata in arm64 errata framework and also
>>>> updates TRBE driver as required.
>>>>
>>>> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
>>>> Cc: Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
>>>> Cc: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@...aro.org>
>>>> Cc: Suzuki Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>
>>>> Cc: coresight@...ts.linaro.org
>>>> Cc: linux-doc@...r.kernel.org
>>>> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org
>>>> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
>>>> Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@....com>
>>>> ---
>>>>    Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.rst       |  2 +
>>>>    arch/arm64/Kconfig                           | 23 ++++++++++
>>>>    arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c               |  9 ++++
>>>>    arch/arm64/tools/cpucaps                     |  1 +
>>>>    drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-trbe.c | 47 +++++++++++++++-----
>>>>    5 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> As with the previous patch, it may be a good idea to split the
>>> patch to arm64 and trbe parts.
>>
>> Sure, will do.
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.rst b/Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.rst
>>>> index c9b30e6c2b6c..e0ef3e9a4b8b 100644
>>>> --- a/Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.rst
>>>> +++ b/Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.rst
>>>> @@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ stable kernels.
>>>>    +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
>>>>    | ARM            | Cortex-A510     | #2064142        | ARM64_ERRATUM_2064142       |
>>>>    +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
>>>> +| ARM            | Cortex-A510     | #2038923        | ARM64_ERRATUM_2038923       |
>>>> ++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
>>>>    | ARM            | Cortex-A53      | #826319         | ARM64_ERRATUM_826319        |
>>>>    +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
>>>>    | ARM            | Cortex-A53      | #827319         | ARM64_ERRATUM_827319        |
>>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
>>>> index 2105b68d88db..026e34fb6fad 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
>>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
>>>> @@ -796,6 +796,29 @@ config ARM64_ERRATUM_2064142
>>>>            If unsure, say Y.
>>>>    +config ARM64_ERRATUM_2038923
>>>> +    bool "Cortex-A510: 2038923: workaround TRBE corruption with enable"
>>>> +    depends on CORESIGHT_TRBE
>>>> +    default y
>>>> +    help
>>>> +      This option adds the workaround for ARM Cortex-A510 erratum 2038923.
>>>> +
>>>> +      Affected Cortex-A510 core might cause an inconsistent view on whether trace is
>>>> +      prohibited within the CPU. As a result, the trace buffer or trace buffer state
>>>> +      might be corrupted. This happens after TRBE buffer has been enabled by setting
>>>> +      TRBLIMITR_EL1.E, followed by just a single context synchronization event before
>>>> +      execution changes from a context, in which trace is prohibited to one where it
>>>> +      isn't, or vice versa. In these mentioned conditions, the view of whether trace
>>>> +      is prohibited is inconsistent between parts of the CPU, and the trace buffer or
>>>> +      the trace buffer state might be corrupted.
>>>> +
>>>> +      Work around this in the driver by preventing an inconsistent view of whether the
>>>> +      trace is prohibited or not based on TRBLIMITR_EL1.E by immediately following a
>>>> +      change to TRBLIMITR_EL1.E with at least one ISB instruction before an ERET, or
>>>> +      two ISB instructions if no ERET is to take place.
>>>> +
>>>> +      If unsure, say Y.
>>>> +
>>>>    config CAVIUM_ERRATUM_22375
>>>>        bool "Cavium erratum 22375, 24313"
>>>>        default y
>>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
>>>> index cbb7d5a9aee7..60b0c1f1d912 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
>>>> @@ -607,6 +607,15 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
>>>>            ERRATA_MIDR_REV_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A510, 0, 0, 2)
>>>>        },
>>>>    #endif
>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_2038923
>>>> +    {
>>>> +        .desc = "ARM erratum 2038923",
>>>> +        .capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_2038923,
>>>> +
>>>> +        /* Cortex-A510 r0p0 - r0p2 */
>>>> +        ERRATA_MIDR_REV_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A510, 0, 0, 2)
>>>> +    },
>>>> +#endif
>>>>        {
>>>>        }
>>>>    };
>>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/tools/cpucaps b/arch/arm64/tools/cpucaps
>>>> index fca3cb329e1d..45a06d36d080 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/arm64/tools/cpucaps
>>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/tools/cpucaps
>>>> @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ WORKAROUND_1463225
>>>>    WORKAROUND_1508412
>>>>    WORKAROUND_1542419
>>>>    WORKAROUND_2064142
>>>> +WORKAROUND_2038923
>>>>    WORKAROUND_TRBE_OVERWRITE_FILL_MODE
>>>>    WORKAROUND_TSB_FLUSH_FAILURE
>>>>    WORKAROUND_TRBE_WRITE_OUT_OF_RANGE
>>>> diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-trbe.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-trbe.c
>>>> index ec24b62b2cec..0689c6dab96d 100644
>>>> --- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-trbe.c
>>>> +++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-trbe.c
>>>> @@ -92,11 +92,13 @@ struct trbe_buf {
>>>>    #define TRBE_WORKAROUND_OVERWRITE_FILL_MODE    0
>>>>    #define TRBE_WORKAROUND_WRITE_OUT_OF_RANGE    1
>>>>    #define TRBE_WORKAROUND_SYSREG_WRITE_FAILURE    2
>>>> +#define TRBE_WORKAROUND_CORRUPTION_WITH_ENABLE    3
>>>>      static int trbe_errata_cpucaps[] = {
>>>>        [TRBE_WORKAROUND_OVERWRITE_FILL_MODE] = ARM64_WORKAROUND_TRBE_OVERWRITE_FILL_MODE,
>>>>        [TRBE_WORKAROUND_WRITE_OUT_OF_RANGE] = ARM64_WORKAROUND_TRBE_WRITE_OUT_OF_RANGE,
>>>>        [TRBE_WORKAROUND_SYSREG_WRITE_FAILURE] = ARM64_WORKAROUND_2064142,
>>>> +    [TRBE_WORKAROUND_CORRUPTION_WITH_ENABLE] = ARM64_WORKAROUND_2038923,
>>>>        -1,        /* Sentinel, must be the last entry */
>>>>    };
>>>>    @@ -174,6 +176,11 @@ static inline bool trbe_may_fail_sysreg_write(struct trbe_cpudata *cpudata)
>>>>        return trbe_has_erratum(cpudata, TRBE_WORKAROUND_SYSREG_WRITE_FAILURE);
>>>>    }
>>>>    +static inline bool trbe_may_corrupt_with_enable(struct trbe_cpudata *cpudata)
>>>> +{
>>>
>>> minor nit: trbe_needs_{ctxt_sync, isb}_after_enable() ?
>>
>> trbe_needs_ctxt_sync_after_enable() sounds better. Also will have to change
>> the index above as well .. TRBE_NEEDS_CTXT_SYNC_AFTER_ENABLE.
>>
>>>
>>>> +    return trbe_has_erratum(cpudata, TRBE_WORKAROUND_CORRUPTION_WITH_ENABLE);
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>>    static int trbe_alloc_node(struct perf_event *event)
>>>>    {
>>>>        if (event->cpu == -1)
>>>> @@ -187,6 +194,30 @@ static inline void trbe_drain_buffer(void)
>>>>        dsb(nsh);
>>>>    }
>>>>    +static inline void set_trbe_enabled(struct trbe_cpudata *cpudata)
>>>> +{
>>>> +    u64 trblimitr = read_sysreg_s(SYS_TRBLIMITR_EL1);
>>>
>>> minor nit: This implies we do the TRBE programming in the following
>>> manner in the common case (i.e, TRBE enabled in the beginning of a
>>> session).
>>>    -> set TRBE LIMIT
>>>    -> read TRBE LIMIT
>>>    -> set TRBE ENABLED
>>>
>>> Could we please optimize this ? I believe the buf->trbe_limit
>>> must hold the LIMITR value at any point in time. And thus this
>>
>> But is not bit risky though ! We have got the following places where
>> given trbe_limit instance changes its value.
>>
>> drivers/../coresight-trbe.c:   buf->trbe_limit = buf->trbe_base + nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
>> drivers/../coresight-trbe.c:   buf->trbe_limit = compute_trbe_buffer_limit(handle);
>> drivers/../coresight-trbe.c:   buf->trbe_limit -= PAGE_SIZE;
> 
> Those are the places where we compute the trbe_limit, *before*
> we enable the TRBE. And we don't change recompute the limit
> *without disabling* the TRBE. To make it more clear, the
> only place where we set TRBE enabled without "computing"
> the trbe_limit is when we hit a spurious interrupt.
> But the value in the TRBLIMITR should already match the
> buf->trbe_limit and we are only going to re-enable the
> TRBE with the same limit. The other option is to
> pass down the "limit" to the set_trbe_enabled().

Since there are just two instances where set_trbe_enabled() gets
called, passing down an additional parameter 'trblimitr' should
still be okay. Some additional code change (like the following)
will achieve this. Does this look okay ?

--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-trbe.c
+++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-trbe.c
@@ -201,10 +201,8 @@ static inline void trbe_drain_buffer(void)
        dsb(nsh);
 }
 
-static inline void set_trbe_enabled(struct trbe_cpudata *cpudata)
+static inline void set_trbe_enabled(struct trbe_cpudata *cpudata, u64 trblimitr)
 {
-       u64 trblimitr = read_sysreg_s(SYS_TRBLIMITR_EL1);
-
        /*
         * Enable the TRBE without clearing LIMITPTR which
         * might be required for fetching the buffer limits.
@@ -626,7 +624,7 @@ static void set_trbe_limit_pointer_enabled(struct trbe_buf *buf)
        trblimitr |= (addr & PAGE_MASK);
 
        write_sysreg_s(trblimitr, SYS_TRBLIMITR_EL1);
-       set_trbe_enabled(buf->cpudata);
+       set_trbe_enabled(buf->cpudata, trblimitr);
 }
 
 static void trbe_enable_hw(struct trbe_buf *buf)
@@ -1050,13 +1048,14 @@ static int arm_trbe_disable(struct coresight_device *csdev)
 static void trbe_handle_spurious(struct perf_output_handle *handle)
 {
        struct trbe_buf *buf = etm_perf_sink_config(handle);
+       u64 trblimitr = read_sysreg_s(SYS_TRBLIMITR_EL1);
 
        /*
         * If the IRQ was spurious, simply re-enable the TRBE
         * back without modifying the buffer parameters to
         * retain the trace collected so far.
         */
-       set_trbe_enabled(buf->cpudata);
+       set_trbe_enabled(buf->cpudata, trblimitr);
 }
 
 static int trbe_handle_overflow(struct perf_output_handle *handle)

 
> 
>>
>>> function could simply be :
>>>
>>> set_trbe_enabled(trbe_buf)
>>> {
>>>      limitr = trbe_buf->limit | LIMITR_ENABLE
>>>      write(limitr, TRBLIMITR_EL1);
>>>      ...
>>> }
>>
>> Is the potential for performance improvement here, out weigh possible
>> risks of using buf->trbe_limit directly while enabling the TRBE ?
> 
> I somehow don't like the fact that we have additional write and read
> for the most common case of the TRBE usage (i.e, for arm_trbe_enable()).
> If we could avoid that, that may be better.
> 
> Cheers
> Suzuki

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