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Message-ID: <YdhEQTnm+XMxoDPW@zn.tnic>
Date: Fri, 7 Jan 2022 14:46:41 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, dave.hansen@...el.com,
luto@...nel.org, peterz@...radead.org,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/26] x86/tdx: Handle in-kernel MMIO
On Wed, Jan 05, 2022 at 06:43:11PM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> Not encrypted, saved/restored by TDX module. But yes, cannot be exposed
> (without guest intend).
>
> I talk here about *why* the traditional way to handle MMIO -- on VMM side
> -- doesn't work for TDX. It's not safe with untrusted VMM.
Lemme see if I understand this correctly: TDX module saves/restores
guest registers so a malicious hypervisor cannot access them? And that's
why you can't do the traditional way MMIO is done?
> readX()/writeX() helpers limit the range of instructions which can trigger
> MMIO. It makes MMIO instruction emulation feasible. Raw access to MMIO
> region allows compiler to generate whatever instruction it wants.
> Supporting all possible instructions is a task of a different scope.
Yap, please add that to the commit message.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
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