[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <a50909dd-fbe5-8e9c-4b98-784d3d0db178@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2022 14:24:18 +0800
From: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@...il.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, x86@...nel.org,
kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KVM: x86/pt: Ignore all unknown Intel PT capabilities
On 11/1/2022 12:20 pm, Like Xu wrote:
>> And is there any possibility of a malicious user/guest using features to cause
>> problems in the host? I.e. does KVM need to enforce that the guest can't enable
>> any unsupported features?
>
> If a user space is set up with features not supported by KVM, it owns the risk
> itself.
I seem to have misunderstood it. KVM should prevent and stop any malicious guest
from destroying other parts on the host, is this the right direction ?
>
> AFAI, the guest Intel PT introduces a great attack interface for the host and
> we only use the guest supported PT features in a highly trusted environment.
>
> I agree that more uncertainty and fixes can be triggered in the security motive,
> not expecting too much from this patch. :D
Powered by blists - more mailing lists