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Open Source and information security mailing list archives
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Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2022 13:21:47 -0700
From: Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Cc: "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev,
linux-mm@...ck.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Sergio Lopez <slp@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@....com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>,
brijesh.ksingh@...il.com, Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>,
Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 40/43] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device
On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 10:19 AM Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com> wrote:
>
> Version 2 of GHCB specification provides Non Automatic Exit (NAE) that can
> be used by the SEV-SNP guest to communicate with the PSP without risk from
> a malicious hypervisor who wishes to read, alter, drop or replay the
> messages sent.
>
> SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE can insert two special pages into the guest’s memory:
> the secrets page and the CPUID page. The PSP firmware populate the contents
> of the secrets page. The secrets page contains encryption keys used by the
> guest to interact with the firmware. Because the secrets page is encrypted
> with the guest’s memory encryption key, the hypervisor cannot read the
> keys. See SEV-SNP firmware spec for further details on the secrets page
> format.
>
> Create a platform device that the SEV-SNP guest driver can bind to get the
> platform resources such as encryption key and message id to use to
> communicate with the PSP. The SEV-SNP guest driver provides a userspace
> interface to get the attestation report, key derivation, extended
> attestation report etc.
>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 4 +++
> arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> index 9830ee1d6ef0..ca977493eb72 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> @@ -95,6 +95,10 @@ struct snp_req_data {
> unsigned int data_npages;
> };
>
> +struct snp_guest_platform_data {
> + u64 secrets_gpa;
> +};
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> extern struct static_key_false sev_es_enable_key;
> extern void __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> index 1d3ac83226fc..1e56ab00d1f4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> @@ -19,6 +19,9 @@
> #include <linux/kernel.h>
> #include <linux/mm.h>
> #include <linux/cpumask.h>
> +#include <linux/efi.h>
> +#include <linux/platform_device.h>
> +#include <linux/io.h>
>
> #include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h>
> #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
> @@ -34,6 +37,7 @@
> #include <asm/cpu.h>
> #include <asm/apic.h>
> #include <asm/cpuid.h>
> +#include <asm/setup.h>
>
> #define DR7_RESET_VALUE 0x400
>
> @@ -2177,3 +2181,60 @@ int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, unsigned
> return ret;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_issue_guest_request);
> +
> +static struct platform_device guest_req_device = {
> + .name = "snp-guest",
> + .id = -1,
> +};
> +
> +static u64 get_secrets_page(void)
> +{
> + u64 pa_data = boot_params.cc_blob_address;
> + struct cc_blob_sev_info info;
> + void *map;
> +
> + /*
> + * The CC blob contains the address of the secrets page, check if the
> + * blob is present.
> + */
> + if (!pa_data)
> + return 0;
> +
> + map = early_memremap(pa_data, sizeof(info));
> + memcpy(&info, map, sizeof(info));
> + early_memunmap(map, sizeof(info));
> +
> + /* smoke-test the secrets page passed */
> + if (!info.secrets_phys || info.secrets_len != PAGE_SIZE)
> + return 0;
This seems like an error condition worth noting. If no cc_blob_address
is passed it makes sense not to log but what if the address passed
fails this smoke test, why not log?
> +
> + return info.secrets_phys;
> +}
> +
> +static int __init init_snp_platform_device(void)
> +{
> + struct snp_guest_platform_data data;
> + u64 gpa;
> +
> + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
> + return -ENODEV;
> +
> + gpa = get_secrets_page();
> + if (!gpa)
> + return -ENODEV;
> +
> + data.secrets_gpa = gpa;
> + if (platform_device_add_data(&guest_req_device, &data, sizeof(data)))
> + goto e_fail;
> +
> + if (platform_device_register(&guest_req_device))
> + goto e_fail;
> +
> + pr_info("SNP guest platform device initialized.\n");
> + return 0;
> +
> +e_fail:
> + pr_err("Failed to initialize SNP guest device\n");
> + return -ENODEV;
> +}
> +device_initcall(init_snp_platform_device);
> --
> 2.25.1
>
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