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Message-Id: <20220207121800.5079-5-mkoutny@suse.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2022 13:17:58 +0100
From: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@...e.com>
To: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Alexey Gladkov <legion@...nel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>,
Ran Xiaokai <ran.xiaokai@....com.cn>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
Linux Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 4/6] ucounts: Allow root to override RLIMIT_NPROC
Call sites of ucounts_limit_cmp() would allow the global root or capable
user to bypass RLIMIT_NPROC on the bottom level of user_ns tree by not
looking at ucounts at all.
As the traversal up the user_ns tree continues, the ucounts to which the
task is charged may switch the owning user (to the creator of user_ns).
If the new chargee is root, we don't really care about RLIMIT_NPROC
observation, so lift the limit to the max.
The result is that an unprivileged user U can globally run more that
RLIMIT_NPROC (of user_ns) tasks but within each user_ns it is still
limited to RLIMINT_NPROC (as passed into task->signal->rlim) iff the
user_nss are created by the privileged user.
Signed-off-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@...e.com>
---
kernel/ucount.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/ucount.c b/kernel/ucount.c
index 53ccd96387dd..f52b7273a572 100644
--- a/kernel/ucount.c
+++ b/kernel/ucount.c
@@ -356,6 +356,9 @@ long ucounts_limit_cmp(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type, unsigned
if (excess > 0)
return excess;
max = READ_ONCE(iter->ns->ucount_max[type]);
+ /* Next ucounts owned by root? RLIMIT_NPROC is moot */
+ if (type == UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC && uid_eq(iter->ns->owner, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID))
+ max = LONG_MAX;
}
return excess;
}
--
2.34.1
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