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Message-ID: <YgI37n+3JfLSNQCQ@grain> Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 12:29:18 +0300 From: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com> To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, Adrian Reber <adrian@...as.de>, Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, x86@...nel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>, "H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>, "Ravi V . Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>, Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>, Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>, "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>, joao.moreira@...el.com, John Allen <john.allen@....com>, kcc@...gle.com, eranian@...gle.com, Andrei Vagin <avagin@...il.com>, Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@...il.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/35] Shadow stacks for userspace On Tue, Feb 08, 2022 at 11:16:51AM +0200, Mike Rapoport wrote: > > > Any thoughts on how you would _like_ to see this resolved? > > Ideally, CRIU will need a knob that will tell the kernel/CET machinery > where the next RET will jump, along the lines of > restore_signal_shadow_stack() AFAIU. > > But such a knob will immediately reduce the security value of the entire > thing, and I don't have good ideas how to deal with it :( Probably a kind of latch in the task_struct which would trigger off once returt to a different address happened, thus we would be able to jump inside paratite code. Of course such trigger should be available under proper capability only.
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