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Date:   Fri, 11 Feb 2022 15:55:23 +0100
From:   Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To:     Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Sergio Lopez <slp@...hat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@....com>,
        Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>,
        brijesh.ksingh@...il.com, tony.luck@...el.com, marcorr@...gle.com,
        sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when
 changing C-bit

+ Kirill.

On Wed, Feb 09, 2022 at 12:10:15PM -0600, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> @@ -2012,8 +2013,22 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
>  	 */
>  	cpa_flush(&cpa, !this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT));
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * To maintain the security guarantees of SEV-SNP guests, make sure
> +	 * to invalidate the memory before clearing the encryption attribute.
> +	 */
> +	if (!enc)
> +		snp_set_memory_shared(addr, numpages);
> +
>  	ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * Now that memory is mapped encrypted in the page table, validate it
> +	 * so that it is consistent with the above page state.
> +	 */
> +	if (!ret && enc)
> +		snp_set_memory_private(addr, numpages);
> +
>  	/*
>  	 * After changing the encryption attribute, we need to flush TLBs again
>  	 * in case any speculative TLB caching occurred (but no need to flush
> -- 

Right, as tglx rightfully points out here:

https://lore.kernel.org/r/875ypyvz07.ffs@tglx

this piece of code needs careful coordinated design so that it is clean
for both SEV and TDX.

First, as we've said here:

https://lore.kernel.org/r/1d77e91c-e151-7846-6cd4-6264236ca5ae@intel.com

we'd need generic functions which turn a pgprot into an encrypted or
decrypted pgprot on both SEV and TDX so we could do:

cc_pgprot_enc()
cc_pgprot_dec()

which does the required conversion on each guest type.

Also, I think adding required functions to x86_platform.guest. is a very
nice way to solve the ugly if (guest_type) querying all over the place.

Also, I was thinking of sme_me_mask and the corresponding
tdx_shared_mask I threw into the mix here:

https://lore.kernel.org/r/YgFIaJ8ijgQQ04Nv@zn.tnic

and we should simply add those without ifdeffery but unconditionally.

Simply have them always present. They will have !0 values on the
respective guest types and 0 otherwise. This should simplify a lot of
code and another unconditionally present u64 won't be the end of the
world.

Any other aspect I'm missing?

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

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