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Message-Id: <B50C7C66-0D24-48E7-9F04-F5BAD277DF7A@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2022 15:32:34 +0100
From: Jakob <jakobkoschel@...il.com>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Arnd Bergman <arnd@...db.de>,
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>,
Brian Johannesmeyer <bjohannesmeyer@...il.com>,
Cristiano Giuffrida <c.giuffrida@...nl>,
"Bos, H.J." <h.j.bos@...nl>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] list: introduce speculative safe
list_for_each_entry()
> On 18. Feb 2022, at 17:29, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Feb 17, 2022 at 7:48 PM Jakob Koschel <jakobkoschel@...il.com> wrote:
>> list_for_each_entry() selects either the correct value (pos) or a safe
>> value for the additional mispredicted iteration (NULL) for the list
>> iterator.
>> list_for_each_entry() calls select_nospec(), which performs
>> a branch-less select.
>>
>> On x86, this select is performed via a cmov. Otherwise, it's performed
>> via various shift/mask/etc. operations.
>>
>> Kasper Acknowledgements: Jakob Koschel, Brian Johannesmeyer, Kaveh
>> Razavi, Herbert Bos, Cristiano Giuffrida from the VUSec group at VU
>> Amsterdam.
>>
>> Co-developed-by: Brian Johannesmeyer <bjohannesmeyer@...il.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Brian Johannesmeyer <bjohannesmeyer@...il.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Jakob Koschel <jakobkoschel@...il.com>
>
> Yeah, I think this is the best way to do this without deeply intrusive
> changes to how lists are represented in memory.
>
> Some notes on the specific implementation:
>
>> arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 12 ++++++++++++
>> include/linux/list.h | 3 ++-
>> include/linux/nospec.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>> 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
>> index 35389b2af88e..722797ad74e2 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
>> @@ -48,6 +48,18 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index,
>> /* Override the default implementation from linux/nospec.h. */
>> #define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec
>>
>> +/* Override the default implementation from linux/nospec.h. */
>> +#define select_nospec(cond, exptrue, expfalse) \
>> +({ \
>> + typeof(exptrue) _out = (exptrue); \
>> + \
>> + asm volatile("test %1, %1\n\t" \
>
> This shouldn't need "volatile", because it is only necessary if _out
> is actually used. Using "volatile" here could prevent optimizing out
> useless code. OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR() also doesn't use "volatile".
>
>> + "cmove %2, %0" \
>> + : "+r" (_out) \
>> + : "r" (cond), "r" (expfalse)); \
>> + _out; \
>> +})
>
> I guess the idea is probably to also add code like this for other
> important architectures, in particular arm64?
yes indeed, with a fallback of using the shifting/masking mechanism for
other archs.
>
>
> It might also be a good idea to rename the arch-overridable macro to
> something like "arch_select_nospec" and then have a wrapper macro in
> include/linux/nospec.h that takes care of type safety issues.
>
> The current definition of the macro doesn't warn if you pass in
> incompatible pointer types, like this:
>
> int *bogus_pointer_mix(int cond, int *a, long *b) {
> return select_nospec(cond, a, b);
> }
>
> and if you pass in integers of different sizes, it may silently
> truncate to the size of the smaller one - this C code:
>
> long wrong_int_conversion(int cond, int a, long b) {
> return select_nospec(cond, a, b);
> }
>
> generates this assembly:
>
> wrong_int_conversion:
> test %edi, %edi
> cmove %rdx, %esi
> movslq %esi, %rax
> ret
>
> It might be a good idea to add something like a
> static_assert(__same_type(...), ...) to protect against that.
These are good points, thank you for your input. Will be good to incorporate.
>
>> /* Prevent speculative execution past this barrier. */
>> #define barrier_nospec() alternative("", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/list.h b/include/linux/list.h
>> index dd6c2041d09c..1a1b39fdd122 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/list.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/list.h
>> @@ -636,7 +636,8 @@ static inline void list_splice_tail_init(struct list_head *list,
>> */
>> #define list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) \
>> for (pos = list_first_entry(head, typeof(*pos), member); \
>> - !list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member); \
>> + ({ bool _cond = !list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member); \
>> + pos = select_nospec(_cond, pos, NULL); _cond; }); \
>> pos = list_next_entry(pos, member))
>
> I wonder if it'd look nicer to write it roughly like this:
>
> #define NOSPEC_TYPE_CHECK(_guarded_var, _cond) \
> ({ \
> bool __cond = (_cond); \
> typeof(_guarded_var) *__guarded_var = &(_guarded_var); \
> *__guarded_var = select_nospec(__cond, *__guarded_var, NULL); \
> __cond; \
> })
>
> #define list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) \
> for (pos = list_first_entry(head, typeof(*pos), member); \
> NOSPEC_TYPE_CHECK(head, !list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member)); \
> pos = list_next_entry(pos, member))
>
> I think having a NOSPEC_TYPE_CHECK() like this makes it semantically
> clearer, and easier to add in other places? But I don't know if the
> others agree...
That sounds like a good idea. I wonder if the pointer and dereference in
NOSPEC_TYPE_CHECK() simply get optimized away. Or why you can't simply
use _guarded_var directly instead of a pointer to it.
>
>> /**
>> diff --git a/include/linux/nospec.h b/include/linux/nospec.h
>> index c1e79f72cd89..ca8ed81e4f9e 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/nospec.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
>> @@ -67,4 +67,20 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
>> /* Speculation control for seccomp enforced mitigation */
>> void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task);
>>
>> +/**
>> + * select_nospec - select a value without using a branch; equivalent to:
>> + * cond ? exptrue : expfalse;
>> + */
>> +#ifndef select_nospec
>> +#define select_nospec(cond, exptrue, expfalse) \
>> +({ \
>> + unsigned long _t = (unsigned long) (exptrue); \
>> + unsigned long _f = (unsigned long) (expfalse); \
>> + unsigned long _c = (unsigned long) (cond); \
>> + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(_c); \
>> + unsigned long _m = -((_c | -_c) >> (BITS_PER_LONG - 1)); \
>> + (typeof(exptrue)) ((_t & _m) | (_f & ~_m)); \
>> +})
>> +#endif
>
> (As a sidenote, it might be easier to implement a conditional zeroing
> primitive than a generic conditional select primitive if that's all
> you need, something like:
>
> #define cond_nullptr_nospec(_cond, _exp) \
> ({ \
> unsigned long __exp = (unsigned long)(_exp); \
> unsigned long _mask = 0UL - !(_cond); \
> OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(_mask); \
> (typeof(_exp)) (_mask & __exp); \
> })
>
> )
Ah yes, if NULL is actually the value to choose, this might be good enough.
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