linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v0 0/6] x86/AMD: Userspace address tagging

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Message-ID: <de443f8b-8ce0-8664-65d6-daa767ba086b@amd.com>
Date:   Fri, 11 Mar 2022 11:12:43 +0530
From:   Bharata B Rao <bharata@....com>
To:     David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>,
        'Dave Hansen' <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Cc:     "linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        "tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "mingo@...hat.com" <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "bp@...en8.de" <bp@...en8.de>,
        "dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "catalin.marinas@....com" <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        "will@...nel.org" <will@...nel.org>,
        "shuah@...nel.org" <shuah@...nel.org>,
        "oleg@...hat.com" <oleg@...hat.com>,
        "ananth.narayan@....com" <ananth.narayan@....com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v0 0/6] x86/AMD: Userspace address tagging

On 3/10/2022 10:49 PM, David Laight wrote:
> From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
>> Sent: 10 March 2022 16:46
>>
>> On 3/10/22 06:32, David Laight wrote:
>>>> UAI allows software to store a tag in the upper 7 bits of a logical
>>>> address [63:57]. When enabled, the processor will suppress the
>>>> traditional canonical address checks on the addresses. More information
>>>> about UAI can be found in section 5.10 of 'AMD64 Architecture
>>>> Programmer's Manual, Vol 2: System Programming' which is available from
>>>>
>>>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fbugzilla.kernel.org%2Fattachment.cgi%3Fid%3D300549&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cbharata%40amd.com%7Ca1de24223931481b3fcb08da02ba2e6f%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637825295938946622%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=HijEAUq172r8YwkcCuhvl99Vk5BwE6iSROXcSQXmJHk%3D&amp;reserved=0
>>> Is that really allowing bit 63 to be used?
>>> That is normally the user-kernel bit.
>>> I can't help feeling that will just badly break things.
>>
>> Yeah, this does seem worrisome.  The LAM approach[1] retains
>> canonicality checking for bit 63.
> 
> Actually it is rather worse than 'worrisome'.
> Allowing the user all address upto the base of the valid
> kernel addresses (probably tags to 3e, but not 3f)
> means that you can't use a fast address check in access_ok().
> You are forced to use the strict test that 32bit kernels use.

>From what I see, there is a single implementation of access_ok()
in arch/x86/asm/include/uaccess.h that does check if the user
address+size exceeds the limit.

Guess I am missing something, but can you please point me to the fast
implementation(that benefits from bit 63 being user/kernel address
disambiguation bit) and the strict checking in 32bit kernels that
are you are referring to?

Also I wonder here why ARM64 TBI which also uses the full upper byte
(including bit 63) for storing tag/metadata doesn't suffer from
this same problem?

Regards,
Bharata.