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Message-ID: <YjK7BppjPCio0xv7@iki.fi>
Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2022 06:37:26 +0200
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@...el.com>,
"Dhanraj, Vijay" <vijay.dhanraj@...el.com>,
"dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"bp@...en8.de" <bp@...en8.de>,
"Lutomirski, Andy" <luto@...nel.org>,
"mingo@...hat.com" <mingo@...hat.com>,
"linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org" <linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
"Christopherson,, Sean" <seanjc@...gle.com>,
"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>,
"Zhang, Cathy" <cathy.zhang@...el.com>,
"Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@...el.com>,
"Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@...el.com>,
"Shanahan, Mark" <mark.shanahan@...el.com>,
"hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
nathaniel@...fian.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page
permissions
On Mon, Mar 14, 2022 at 10:39:36AM -0500, Haitao Huang wrote:
> I also see this model as consistent to what kernel does for regular memory
> mappings: adding physical pages on #PF or pre-fault and changing PTE
> permissions only after mprotect is called.
And you were against this in EAUG's case. As in the EAUG's case
EMODPR could be done as part of the mprotect() flow.
BR, Jarkko
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