Date:   Thu, 21 Apr 2022 15:20:29 +0000
From:   Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To:     Jon Kohler <jon@...anix.com>
Cc:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Balbir Singh <sblbir@...zon.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@....com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/speculation, KVM: only IBPB for
 switch_mm_always_ibpb on vCPU load

On Mon, Apr 18, 2022, Jon Kohler wrote:
> On vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs and svm_vcpu_load, respect user controlled
> configuration for conditional IBPB and only attempt IBPB MSR when
> switching between different guest vCPUs IFF switch_mm_always_ibpb,
> which fixes a situation where the kernel will issue IBPB
> unconditionally even when conditional IBPB is enabled.
> 
> If a user has spectre_v2_user mitigation enabled, in any
> configuration, and the underlying processor supports X86_FEATURE_IBPB,
> X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB is set and any calls to
> indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() will issue IBPB MSR.
> 
> Depending on the spectre_v2_user configuration, either
> switch_mm_always_ibpb key or switch_mm_cond_ibpb key will be set.
> 
> Both switch_mm_always_ibpb and switch_mm_cond_ibpb are handled by
> switch_mm() -> cond_mitigation(), which works well in cases where
> switching vCPUs (i.e. switching tasks) also switches mm_struct;
> however, this misses a paranoid case where user space may be running
> multiple guests in a single process (i.e. single mm_struct).
> 
> This paranoid case is already covered by vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs and
> svm_vcpu_load; however, this is done by calling
> indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() and thus the kernel
> unconditionally issues IBPB if X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB is set.

The changelog should call out that switch_mm_cond_ibpb is intentionally "ignored"
for the virt case, and explain why it's nonsensical to emit IBPB in that scenario.

> Fix by using intermediary call to x86_virt_guest_switch_ibpb(), which
> gates IBPB MSR IFF switch_mm_always_ibpb is true. This is useful for
> security paranoid VMMs in either single process or multi-process VMM
> configurations.

Multi-process VMM?  KVM doesn't allow "sharing" a VM across processes.  Userspace
can share guest memory across processes, but that's not relevant to an IBPB on
guest switch.  I suspect you're loosely referring to all of userspace as a single
VMM.  That's inaccurate, or at least unnecessarily confusing, from a kernel
perspective.  I am not aware of a VMM that runs as a monolithic "daemon" and forks
a new process for every VM.  And even in such a case, I would argue that most
people would refer to each process as a separate VMM.

If there's a blurb about the switch_mm_cond_ibpb case being nonsensical, there's
probably a good segue into stating the new behavior.

> switch_mm_always_ibpb key is user controlled via spectre_v2_user and
> will be true for the following configurations:
>   spectre_v2_user=on
>   spectre_v2_user=prctl,ibpb
>   spectre_v2_user=seccomp,ibpb
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jon Kohler <jon@...anix.com>
> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
> Cc: Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>
> ---
> v1 -> v2:
>  - Addressed comments on approach from Sean.
> 
>  arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c       |  6 +++++-
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c           |  2 +-
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c           |  2 +-
>  4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
> index 5393babc0598..1ad140b17ad7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
> @@ -85,4 +85,19 @@ static inline void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void) { }
>  extern void speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tif);
>  extern void speculation_ctrl_update_current(void);
> 
> +/*
> + * Issue IBPB when switching guest vCPUs IFF if switch_mm_always_ibpb.

Extra "if" there.

> + * Primarily useful for security paranoid (or naive) user space VMMs
> + * that may run multiple VMs within a single process.
> + * For multi-process VMMs, switching vCPUs, i.e. switching tasks,

As above, "multi-process VMMs" is very confusing, they're really just separate VMMs.
Something like this?

 * For the more common case of running VMs in their own dedicated process,
 * switching vCPUs that belong to different VMs, i.e. switching tasks, will also
 * ...

> + * will also switch mm_structs and thus do IPBP via cond_mitigation();
> + * however, in the always_ibpb case, take a paranoid approach and issue
> + * IBPB on both switch_mm() and vCPU switch.
> + */
> +static inline void x86_virt_guest_switch_ibpb(void)
> +{
> +	if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_mm_always_ibpb))
> +		indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
> +}
> +
>  #endif
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> index 6296e1ebed1d..6aafb0279cbc 100644

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