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Message-ID: <DU2PR04MB86306B75C018C7CAB9FFA57195FD9@DU2PR04MB8630.eurprd04.prod.outlook.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2022 12:50:50 +0000
From: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@....com>
To: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@....com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>
CC: "kernel@...gutronix.de" <kernel@...gutronix.de>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Steffen Trumtrar <s.trumtrar@...gutronix.de>,
Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>,
David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
Franck Lenormand <franck.lenormand@....com>,
Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>,
Andreas Rammhold <andreas@...mhold.de>,
"tharvey@...eworks.com" <tharvey@...eworks.com>,
Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@...tq-group.com>,
"linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
"keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [EXT] [PATCH v7 0/6] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP
CAAM-based trusted keys
Hi Ahmad,
I have tested the patch-set.
It is working as expected even when CAAM is compiled as kernel module.
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@....com>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@....com>
Regards
Pankaj
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>
> Sent: Saturday, April 16, 2022 2:27 AM
> To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>; Horia Geanta
> <horia.geanta@....com>; Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>; Pankaj
> Gupta <pankaj.gupta@....com>; Herbert Xu
> <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>; David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>;
> James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>
> Cc: kernel@...gutronix.de; David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>; James
> Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>; Serge E. Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>; Steffen
> Trumtrar <s.trumtrar@...gutronix.de>; Jan Luebbe
> <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>; David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>; Eric Biggers
> <ebiggers@...nel.org>; Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>; Franck
> Lenormand <franck.lenormand@....com>; Sumit Garg
> <sumit.garg@...aro.org>; Andreas Rammhold <andreas@...mhold.de>;
> tharvey@...eworks.com; Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@...tq-
> group.com>; linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org; keyrings@...r.kernel.org;
> linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org; linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org; linux-security-
> module@...r.kernel.org
> Subject: [EXT] [PATCH v7 0/6] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP
> CAAM-based trusted keys
>
> Caution: EXT Email
>
> Series applies on top of v5.18-rc2
>
> v6 was here:
> https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flore.k
> ernel.org%2Flinux-integrity%2F20220316164335.1720255-1-
> a.fatoum%40pengutronix.de%2F&data=04%7C01%7Cpankaj.gupta%40n
> xp.com%7C59fba782ed2445f72a3708da1f228c18%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd
> 99c5c301635%7C0%7C0%7C637856530483504933%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZ
> sb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6M
> n0%3D%7C3000&sdata=HX0dpx79%2BRpfD0CTzd59XgcdEIOmUV0BtL3Y
> 36Sx1AY%3D&reserved=0
>
> Changelog is beneath each individual patch.
>
>
> The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core
> built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.
>
> Its blob mechanism can AES encrypt/decrypt user data using a unique never-
> disclosed device-specific key.
>
> There has been multiple discussions on how to represent this within the
> kernel:
>
> The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core
> built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.
>
> Its blob mechanism can AES encrypt/decrypt user data using a unique never-
> disclosed device-specific key. There has been multiple discussions on how to
> represent this within the kernel:
>
> - [RFC] crypto: caam - add red blobifier
> Steffen implemented[1] a PoC sysfs driver to start a discussion on how to
> best integrate the blob mechanism.
> Mimi suggested that it could be used to implement trusted keys.
> Trusted keys back then were a TPM-only feature.
>
> - security/keys/secure_key: Adds the secure key support based on CAAM.
> Udit Agarwal added[2] a new "secure" key type with the CAAM as backend.
> The key material stays within the kernel only.
> Mimi and James agreed that this needs a generic interface, not specific
> to CAAM. Mimi suggested trusted keys. Jan noted that this could serve as
> basis for TEE-backed keys.
>
> - [RFC] drivers: crypto: caam: key: Add caam_tk key type
> Franck added[3] a new "caam_tk" key type based on Udit's work. This time
> it uses CAAM "black blobs" instead of "red blobs", so key material stays
> within the CAAM and isn't exposed to kernel in plaintext.
> James voiced the opinion that there should be just one user-facing generic
> wrap/unwrap key type with multiple possible handlers.
> David suggested trusted keys.
>
> - Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support
> Sumit reworked[4] trusted keys to support multiple possible backends with
> one chosen at boot time and added a new TEE backend along with TPM.
> This now sits in Jarkko's master branch to be sent out for v5.13
>
> This patch series builds on top of Sumit's rework to have the CAAM as yet
> another trusted key backend.
>
> The CAAM bits are based on Steffen's initial patch from 2015. His work had
> been used in the field for some years now, so I preferred not to deviate too
> much from it.
>
> This series has been tested with dmcrypt[5] on an i.MX6Q/DL and an
> i.MX8M[6].
>
> Looking forward to your feedback.
>
> Cheers,
> Ahmad
>
> [1]:
> https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flore.k
> ernel.org%2Flinux-crypto%2F1447082306-19946-2-git-send-email-
> s.trumtrar%40pengutronix.de%2F&data=04%7C01%7Cpankaj.gupta%40
> nxp.com%7C59fba782ed2445f72a3708da1f228c18%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92c
> d99c5c301635%7C0%7C0%7C637856530483504933%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbG
> Zsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6
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> bLBEi5M%3D&reserved=0
> [2]:
> https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flore.k
> ernel.org%2Flinux-integrity%2F20180723111432.26830-1-
> udit.agarwal%40nxp.com%2F&data=04%7C01%7Cpankaj.gupta%40nxp.
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> FAgMgs%3D&reserved=0
> [3]:
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> ernel.org%2Flkml%2F1551456599-10603-2-git-send-email-
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> 0nxp.com%7C59fba782ed2445f72a3708da1f228c18%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92
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> KoKOvtUGvijdu2rgSMCg%3D&reserved=0
> [4]:
> https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flore.k
> ernel.org%2Flkml%2F1604419306-26105-1-git-send-email-
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> om%7C59fba782ed2445f72a3708da1f228c18%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd99c5
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> [5]:
> https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flore.k
> ernel.org%2Flinux-integrity%2F20210122084321.24012-2-
> a.fatoum%40pengutronix.de%2F&data=04%7C01%7Cpankaj.gupta%40n
> xp.com%7C59fba782ed2445f72a3708da1f228c18%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd
> 99c5c301635%7C0%7C0%7C637856530483504933%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZ
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> tEZq94w13kY%3D&reserved=0
> [6]:
> https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flore.k
> ernel.org%2Flinux-
> integrity%2FDU2PR04MB8630D83FE9BBC0D782C4FAF595089%40DU2PR04MB
> 8630.eurprd04.prod.outlook.com%2F&data=04%7C01%7Cpankaj.gupta
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> 92cd99c5c301635%7C0%7C0%7C637856530483504933%7CUnknown%7CTWFp
> bGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVC
> I6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=jOJusQxZ%2BUfjxDKyMImc4BYjO8sFmamV
> b5LnAo%2BknFc%3D&reserved=0
>
> ---
> To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
> To: "Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@....com>
> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
> To: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@....com>
> To: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
> To: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
> To: James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
> Cc: Steffen Trumtrar <s.trumtrar@...gutronix.de>
> Cc: Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>
> Cc: David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>
> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
> Cc: Franck LENORMAND <franck.lenormand@....com>
> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
> Cc: Andreas Rammhold <andreas@...mhold.de>
> Cc: Tim Harvey <tharvey@...eworks.com>
> Cc: Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@...tq-group.com>
> Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: keyrings@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
>
> Ahmad Fatoum (6):
> KEYS: trusted: allow use of TEE as backend without TCG_TPM support
> KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material
> crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator
> KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys
> doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source
> MAINTAINERS: add myself as CAAM trusted key maintainer
>
> .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 ++
> .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 60 ++++++-
> MAINTAINERS | 9 +
> drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig | 3 +
> drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile | 1 +
> drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c | 164 ++++++++++++++++++
> include/keys/trusted-type.h | 2 +-
> include/keys/trusted_caam.h | 11 ++
> include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h | 102 +++++++++++
> security/keys/Kconfig | 18 +-
> security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 38 ++++
> security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 10 +-
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c | 82 +++++++++
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 45 ++++-
> 14 files changed, 527 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) create mode 100644
> drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c create mode 100644
> include/keys/trusted_caam.h create mode 100644 include/soc/fsl/caam-
> blob.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
> create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
>
> --
> 2.30.2
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