linux-kernel - [PATCH v12 14/16] KVM: x86/vmx: Flip Arch LBREn bit on guest state change

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <20220517154100.29983-15-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Date:   Tue, 17 May 2022 11:40:58 -0400
From:   Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
To:     pbonzini@...hat.com, jmattson@...gle.com, seanjc@...gle.com,
        like.xu.linux@...il.com, vkuznets@...hat.com,
        kan.liang@...ux.intel.com, wei.w.wang@...el.com,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH v12 14/16] KVM: x86/vmx: Flip Arch LBREn bit on guest state change

Per spec:"IA32_LBR_CTL.LBREn is saved and cleared on #SMI, and restored
on RSM. On a warm reset, all LBR MSRs, including IA32_LBR_DEPTH, have their
values preserved. However, IA32_LBR_CTL.LBREn is cleared to 0, disabling
LBRs." At guest SMM entry, store guest IA32_LBR_CTL in SMRAM and clear LBREn
in VMCS, do reverse things at SMM exit. Also clear LBREn at warm reset.

Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 7dfa961d6829..9b2f84998b45 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -4674,6 +4674,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
 	if (!init_event) {
 		if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR))
 			vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_LBR_CTL, 0);
+	} else {
+		disable_arch_lbr_ctl(vcpu);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -7796,6 +7798,8 @@ static int vmx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
 
 static int vmx_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate)
 {
+	struct lbr_desc *lbr_desc = vcpu_to_lbr_desc(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
 	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
 	vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode = is_guest_mode(vcpu);
@@ -7805,11 +7809,22 @@ static int vmx_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate)
 	vmx->nested.smm.vmxon = vmx->nested.vmxon;
 	vmx->nested.vmxon = false;
 	vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
+
+	if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR) &&
+	    test_bit(INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_VLBR, pmu->pmc_in_use) &&
+	    lbr_desc->event && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM)) {
+		u64 ctl = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_LBR_CTL);
+
+		put_smstate(u64, smstate, 0x7f10, ctl);
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_LBR_CTL, ctl & ~ARCH_LBR_CTL_LBREN);
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static int vmx_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate)
 {
+	struct lbr_desc *lbr_desc = vcpu_to_lbr_desc(vcpu);
 	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 	int ret;
 
@@ -7826,6 +7841,17 @@ static int vmx_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate)
 		vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 1;
 		vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode = false;
 	}
+
+	if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR) &&
+	    guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM)) {
+		u64 ctl = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7f10);
+
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_LBR_CTL, ctl | ARCH_LBR_CTL_LBREN);
+
+		if (intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(vcpu) && !lbr_desc->event)
+			intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event(vcpu);
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.27.0