linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] kcov: fix race caused by unblocked interrupt

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Date:   Wed, 18 May 2022 10:59:14 +0200
From:   Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
To:     Congyu Liu <liu3101@...due.edu>
Cc:     andreyknvl@...il.com, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kcov: fix race caused by unblocked interrupt

On Wed, 18 May 2022 at 10:56, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, 17 May 2022 at 23:05, Congyu Liu <liu3101@...due.edu> wrote:
> >
> > Some code runs in interrupts cannot be blocked by `in_task()` check.
> > In some unfortunate interleavings, such interrupt is raised during
> > serializing trace data and the incoming nested trace functionn could
> > lead to loss of previous trace data. For instance, in
> > `__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc`, if such interrupt is raised between
> > `area[pos] = ip;` and `WRITE_ONCE(area[0], pos);`, then trace data in
> > `area[pos]` could be replaced.
> >
> > The fix is done by adding a flag indicating if the trace buffer is being
> > updated. No modification to trace buffer is allowed when the flag is set.
>
> Hi Congyu,
>
> What is that interrupt code? What interrupts PCs do you see in the trace.
> I would assume such early interrupt code should be in asm and/or not
> instrumented. The presence of instrumented traced interrupt code is
> problematic for other reasons (add random stray coverage to the
> trace). So if we make it not traced, it would resolve both problems at
> once and without the fast path overhead that this change adds.

Also thinking if reordering `area[pos] = ip;` and `WRITE_ONCE(area[0], pos);`
will resolve the problem without adding fast path overhead.
However, not instrumenting early interrupt code still looks more preferable.


 > Signed-off-by: Congyu Liu <liu3101@...due.edu>
> > ---
> >  include/linux/sched.h |  3 +++
> >  kernel/kcov.c         | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> >  2 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
> > index a8911b1f35aa..d06cedd9595f 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/sched.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
> > @@ -1408,6 +1408,9 @@ struct task_struct {
> >
> >         /* Collect coverage from softirq context: */
> >         unsigned int                    kcov_softirq;
> > +
> > +       /* Flag of if KCOV area is being written: */
> > +       bool                            kcov_writing;
> >  #endif
> >
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
> > diff --git a/kernel/kcov.c b/kernel/kcov.c
> > index b3732b210593..a595a8ad5d8a 100644
> > --- a/kernel/kcov.c
> > +++ b/kernel/kcov.c
> > @@ -165,6 +165,8 @@ static notrace bool check_kcov_mode(enum kcov_mode needed_mode, struct task_stru
> >          */
> >         if (!in_task() && !(in_serving_softirq() && t->kcov_softirq))
> >                 return false;
> > +       if (READ_ONCE(t->kcov_writing))
> > +               return false;
> >         mode = READ_ONCE(t->kcov_mode);
> >         /*
> >          * There is some code that runs in interrupts but for which
> > @@ -201,12 +203,19 @@ void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void)
> >                 return;
> >
> >         area = t->kcov_area;
> > +
> > +       /* Prevent race from unblocked interrupt. */
> > +       WRITE_ONCE(t->kcov_writing, true);
> > +       barrier();
> > +
> >         /* The first 64-bit word is the number of subsequent PCs. */
> >         pos = READ_ONCE(area[0]) + 1;
> >         if (likely(pos < t->kcov_size)) {
> >                 area[pos] = ip;
> >                 WRITE_ONCE(area[0], pos);
> >         }
> > +       barrier();
> > +       WRITE_ONCE(t->kcov_writing, false);
> >  }
> >  EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc);
> >
> > @@ -230,6 +239,10 @@ static void notrace write_comp_data(u64 type, u64 arg1, u64 arg2, u64 ip)
> >         area = (u64 *)t->kcov_area;
> >         max_pos = t->kcov_size * sizeof(unsigned long);
> >
> > +       /* Prevent race from unblocked interrupt. */
> > +       WRITE_ONCE(t->kcov_writing, true);
> > +       barrier();
> > +
> >         count = READ_ONCE(area[0]);
> >
> >         /* Every record is KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP 64-bit words. */
> > @@ -242,6 +255,8 @@ static void notrace write_comp_data(u64 type, u64 arg1, u64 arg2, u64 ip)
> >                 area[start_index + 3] = ip;
> >                 WRITE_ONCE(area[0], count + 1);
> >         }
> > +       barrier();
> > +       WRITE_ONCE(t->kcov_writing, false);
> >  }
> >
> >  void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp1(u8 arg1, u8 arg2)
> > @@ -335,6 +350,7 @@ static void kcov_start(struct task_struct *t, struct kcov *kcov,
> >         t->kcov_size = size;
> >         t->kcov_area = area;
> >         t->kcov_sequence = sequence;
> > +       t->kcov_writing = false;
> >         /* See comment in check_kcov_mode(). */
> >         barrier();
> >         WRITE_ONCE(t->kcov_mode, mode);
> > --
> > 2.34.1
> >