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Date:   Sat, 21 May 2022 03:59:28 +0000
From:   "Liu, Congyu" <liu3101@...due.edu>
To:     Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
CC:     "andreyknvl@...il.com" <andreyknvl@...il.com>,
        "kasan-dev@...glegroups.com" <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kcov: fix race caused by unblocked interrupt

Hi Dmitry,

Sorry for the late reply. I did some experiments and hopefully they could be helpful.

To get the PC of the code that tampered with the buffer, I added some code between `area[pos] = ip;` and `WRITE_ONCE(area[0], pos);`: First, some code to delay for a while (e.g. for loop to write something). Then read `area[0]` and compare it with `pos`. If they are different, then `area[pos]` is tampered. A mask is then added to `area[pos]` so I can identify and retrieve it later.

In this way, I ran some test cases then get a list of PCs that tampered with the kcov buffer, e.g., ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:rcu_read_lock, arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:get_current, include/sound/pcm.h:hw_is_interval, net/core/neighbour.c:neigh_flush_dev, net/ipv6/addrconf.c:__ipv6_dev_get_saddr, mm/mempolicy.c:__get_vma_policy...... It seems that they are not from the early interrupt code. Do you think they should not be instrumented?

I think reordering `area[pos] = ip;` and `WRITE_ONCE(area[0], pos);` is also a smart solution since PC will be written to buffer only after the buffer is reserved.

Thanks,
Congyu

________________________________________
From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2022 4:59
To: Liu, Congyu
Cc: andreyknvl@...il.com; kasan-dev@...glegroups.com; linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kcov: fix race caused by unblocked interrupt

On Wed, 18 May 2022 at 10:56, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, 17 May 2022 at 23:05, Congyu Liu <liu3101@...due.edu> wrote:
> >
> > Some code runs in interrupts cannot be blocked by `in_task()` check.
> > In some unfortunate interleavings, such interrupt is raised during
> > serializing trace data and the incoming nested trace functionn could
> > lead to loss of previous trace data. For instance, in
> > `__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc`, if such interrupt is raised between
> > `area[pos] = ip;` and `WRITE_ONCE(area[0], pos);`, then trace data in
> > `area[pos]` could be replaced.
> >
> > The fix is done by adding a flag indicating if the trace buffer is being
> > updated. No modification to trace buffer is allowed when the flag is set.
>
> Hi Congyu,
>
> What is that interrupt code? What interrupts PCs do you see in the trace.
> I would assume such early interrupt code should be in asm and/or not
> instrumented. The presence of instrumented traced interrupt code is
> problematic for other reasons (add random stray coverage to the
> trace). So if we make it not traced, it would resolve both problems at
> once and without the fast path overhead that this change adds.

Also thinking if reordering `area[pos] = ip;` and `WRITE_ONCE(area[0], pos);`
will resolve the problem without adding fast path overhead.
However, not instrumenting early interrupt code still looks more preferable.


 > Signed-off-by: Congyu Liu <liu3101@...due.edu>
> > ---
> >  include/linux/sched.h |  3 +++
> >  kernel/kcov.c         | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> >  2 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
> > index a8911b1f35aa..d06cedd9595f 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/sched.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
> > @@ -1408,6 +1408,9 @@ struct task_struct {
> >
> >         /* Collect coverage from softirq context: */
> >         unsigned int                    kcov_softirq;
> > +
> > +       /* Flag of if KCOV area is being written: */
> > +       bool                            kcov_writing;
> >  #endif
> >
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
> > diff --git a/kernel/kcov.c b/kernel/kcov.c
> > index b3732b210593..a595a8ad5d8a 100644
> > --- a/kernel/kcov.c
> > +++ b/kernel/kcov.c
> > @@ -165,6 +165,8 @@ static notrace bool check_kcov_mode(enum kcov_mode needed_mode, struct task_stru
> >          */
> >         if (!in_task() && !(in_serving_softirq() && t->kcov_softirq))
> >                 return false;
> > +       if (READ_ONCE(t->kcov_writing))
> > +               return false;
> >         mode = READ_ONCE(t->kcov_mode);
> >         /*
> >          * There is some code that runs in interrupts but for which
> > @@ -201,12 +203,19 @@ void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void)
> >                 return;
> >
> >         area = t->kcov_area;
> > +
> > +       /* Prevent race from unblocked interrupt. */
> > +       WRITE_ONCE(t->kcov_writing, true);
> > +       barrier();
> > +
> >         /* The first 64-bit word is the number of subsequent PCs. */
> >         pos = READ_ONCE(area[0]) + 1;
> >         if (likely(pos < t->kcov_size)) {
> >                 area[pos] = ip;
> >                 WRITE_ONCE(area[0], pos);
> >         }
> > +       barrier();
> > +       WRITE_ONCE(t->kcov_writing, false);
> >  }
> >  EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc);
> >
> > @@ -230,6 +239,10 @@ static void notrace write_comp_data(u64 type, u64 arg1, u64 arg2, u64 ip)
> >         area = (u64 *)t->kcov_area;
> >         max_pos = t->kcov_size * sizeof(unsigned long);
> >
> > +       /* Prevent race from unblocked interrupt. */
> > +       WRITE_ONCE(t->kcov_writing, true);
> > +       barrier();
> > +
> >         count = READ_ONCE(area[0]);
> >
> >         /* Every record is KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP 64-bit words. */
> > @@ -242,6 +255,8 @@ static void notrace write_comp_data(u64 type, u64 arg1, u64 arg2, u64 ip)
> >                 area[start_index + 3] = ip;
> >                 WRITE_ONCE(area[0], count + 1);
> >         }
> > +       barrier();
> > +       WRITE_ONCE(t->kcov_writing, false);
> >  }
> >
> >  void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp1(u8 arg1, u8 arg2)
> > @@ -335,6 +350,7 @@ static void kcov_start(struct task_struct *t, struct kcov *kcov,
> >         t->kcov_size = size;
> >         t->kcov_area = area;
> >         t->kcov_sequence = sequence;
> > +       t->kcov_writing = false;
> >         /* See comment in check_kcov_mode(). */
> >         barrier();
> >         WRITE_ONCE(t->kcov_mode, mode);
> > --
> > 2.34.1
> >

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