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Message-ID: <CACT4Y+bXyiwEznZkAH5vRNd6YK3gi4aCncQLYt3iMWy43+T4EQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 21 May 2022 10:45:05 +0200
From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
To: "Liu, Congyu" <liu3101@...due.edu>
Cc: "andreyknvl@...il.com" <andreyknvl@...il.com>,
"kasan-dev@...glegroups.com" <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kcov: fix race caused by unblocked interrupt
On Sat, 21 May 2022 at 05:59, Liu, Congyu <liu3101@...due.edu> wrote:
>
> Hi Dmitry,
>
> Sorry for the late reply. I did some experiments and hopefully they could be helpful.
>
> To get the PC of the code that tampered with the buffer, I added some code between `area[pos] = ip;` and `WRITE_ONCE(area[0], pos);`: First, some code to delay for a while (e.g. for loop to write something). Then read `area[0]` and compare it with `pos`. If they are different, then `area[pos]` is tampered. A mask is then added to `area[pos]` so I can identify and retrieve it later.
>
> In this way, I ran some test cases then get a list of PCs that tampered with the kcov buffer, e.g., ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:rcu_read_lock, arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:get_current, include/sound/pcm.h:hw_is_interval, net/core/neighbour.c:neigh_flush_dev, net/ipv6/addrconf.c:__ipv6_dev_get_saddr, mm/mempolicy.c:__get_vma_policy...... It seems that they are not from the early interrupt code. Do you think they should not be instrumented?
Humm... these look strange. They don't look like early interrupt code,
but they also don't look like interrupt code at all. E.g.
neigh_flush_dev looks like a very high level function that takes some
mutexes:
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.18-rc7/source/net/core/neighbour.c#L320
It seems that there is something happening that we don't understand.
Please try to set t->kcov_writing around the task access, and then if
you see it recursively already set print the current pc/stack trace.
That should give better visibility into what code enters kcov
recursively.
If you are using syzkaller tools, you can run syz-execprog with -cover
flag on some log file, or run some program undef kcovtrace:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/tools/kcovtrace/kcovtrace.c
> I think reordering `area[pos] = ip;` and `WRITE_ONCE(area[0], pos);` is also a smart solution since PC will be written to buffer only after the buffer is reserved.
>
> Thanks,
> Congyu
>
> ________________________________________
> From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
> Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2022 4:59
> To: Liu, Congyu
> Cc: andreyknvl@...il.com; kasan-dev@...glegroups.com; linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
> Subject: Re: [PATCH] kcov: fix race caused by unblocked interrupt
>
> On Wed, 18 May 2022 at 10:56, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, 17 May 2022 at 23:05, Congyu Liu <liu3101@...due.edu> wrote:
> > >
> > > Some code runs in interrupts cannot be blocked by `in_task()` check.
> > > In some unfortunate interleavings, such interrupt is raised during
> > > serializing trace data and the incoming nested trace functionn could
> > > lead to loss of previous trace data. For instance, in
> > > `__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc`, if such interrupt is raised between
> > > `area[pos] = ip;` and `WRITE_ONCE(area[0], pos);`, then trace data in
> > > `area[pos]` could be replaced.
> > >
> > > The fix is done by adding a flag indicating if the trace buffer is being
> > > updated. No modification to trace buffer is allowed when the flag is set.
> >
> > Hi Congyu,
> >
> > What is that interrupt code? What interrupts PCs do you see in the trace.
> > I would assume such early interrupt code should be in asm and/or not
> > instrumented. The presence of instrumented traced interrupt code is
> > problematic for other reasons (add random stray coverage to the
> > trace). So if we make it not traced, it would resolve both problems at
> > once and without the fast path overhead that this change adds.
>
> Also thinking if reordering `area[pos] = ip;` and `WRITE_ONCE(area[0], pos);`
> will resolve the problem without adding fast path overhead.
> However, not instrumenting early interrupt code still looks more preferable.
>
>
> > Signed-off-by: Congyu Liu <liu3101@...due.edu>
> > > ---
> > > include/linux/sched.h | 3 +++
> > > kernel/kcov.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> > > 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
> > > index a8911b1f35aa..d06cedd9595f 100644
> > > --- a/include/linux/sched.h
> > > +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
> > > @@ -1408,6 +1408,9 @@ struct task_struct {
> > >
> > > /* Collect coverage from softirq context: */
> > > unsigned int kcov_softirq;
> > > +
> > > + /* Flag of if KCOV area is being written: */
> > > + bool kcov_writing;
> > > #endif
> > >
> > > #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
> > > diff --git a/kernel/kcov.c b/kernel/kcov.c
> > > index b3732b210593..a595a8ad5d8a 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/kcov.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/kcov.c
> > > @@ -165,6 +165,8 @@ static notrace bool check_kcov_mode(enum kcov_mode needed_mode, struct task_stru
> > > */
> > > if (!in_task() && !(in_serving_softirq() && t->kcov_softirq))
> > > return false;
> > > + if (READ_ONCE(t->kcov_writing))
> > > + return false;
> > > mode = READ_ONCE(t->kcov_mode);
> > > /*
> > > * There is some code that runs in interrupts but for which
> > > @@ -201,12 +203,19 @@ void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void)
> > > return;
> > >
> > > area = t->kcov_area;
> > > +
> > > + /* Prevent race from unblocked interrupt. */
> > > + WRITE_ONCE(t->kcov_writing, true);
> > > + barrier();
> > > +
> > > /* The first 64-bit word is the number of subsequent PCs. */
> > > pos = READ_ONCE(area[0]) + 1;
> > > if (likely(pos < t->kcov_size)) {
> > > area[pos] = ip;
> > > WRITE_ONCE(area[0], pos);
> > > }
> > > + barrier();
> > > + WRITE_ONCE(t->kcov_writing, false);
> > > }
> > > EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc);
> > >
> > > @@ -230,6 +239,10 @@ static void notrace write_comp_data(u64 type, u64 arg1, u64 arg2, u64 ip)
> > > area = (u64 *)t->kcov_area;
> > > max_pos = t->kcov_size * sizeof(unsigned long);
> > >
> > > + /* Prevent race from unblocked interrupt. */
> > > + WRITE_ONCE(t->kcov_writing, true);
> > > + barrier();
> > > +
> > > count = READ_ONCE(area[0]);
> > >
> > > /* Every record is KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP 64-bit words. */
> > > @@ -242,6 +255,8 @@ static void notrace write_comp_data(u64 type, u64 arg1, u64 arg2, u64 ip)
> > > area[start_index + 3] = ip;
> > > WRITE_ONCE(area[0], count + 1);
> > > }
> > > + barrier();
> > > + WRITE_ONCE(t->kcov_writing, false);
> > > }
> > >
> > > void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp1(u8 arg1, u8 arg2)
> > > @@ -335,6 +350,7 @@ static void kcov_start(struct task_struct *t, struct kcov *kcov,
> > > t->kcov_size = size;
> > > t->kcov_area = area;
> > > t->kcov_sequence = sequence;
> > > + t->kcov_writing = false;
> > > /* See comment in check_kcov_mode(). */
> > > barrier();
> > > WRITE_ONCE(t->kcov_mode, mode);
> > > --
> > > 2.34.1
> > >
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