linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH -next v3 2/2] blk-throttle: fix io hung due to configuration updates

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Message-ID: <Yoe/1BRYzSRI0JBd@slm.duckdns.org>
Date:   Fri, 20 May 2022 06:20:36 -1000
From:   Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>
To:     Michal Koutný <mkoutny@...e.com>
Cc:     "yukuai (C)" <yukuai3@...wei.com>, axboe@...nel.dk,
        ming.lei@...hat.com, geert@...ux-m68k.org, cgroups@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-block@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        yi.zhang@...wei.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH -next v3 2/2] blk-throttle: fix io hung due to
 configuration updates

Hello,

On Fri, May 20, 2022 at 06:03:05PM +0200, Michal Koutný wrote:
> > Then io hung can be triggered by always submmiting new configuration
> > before the throttled bio is dispatched.
> 
> How big is this a problem actually? Is it only shooting oneself in the leg
> or can there be a user who's privileged enough to modify throttling
> configuration yet not privileged enough to justify the hung's
> consequences (like some global FS locks).

So, the problem in itself is of the self-inflicted type and I'd prefer to
ignore it. Unfortunately, the kernel doesn't have the kind of isolation
where stalling out some aribtrary tasks is generally safe, especially not
blk-throtl as it doesn't handle bio_issue_as_root() and thus can have a
pretty severe priority inversions where IOs which can block system-wide
operations (e.g. memory reclaim) get trapped in a random cgroup.

Even ignoring that, the kernel in general assumes some forward progress from
everybody and when a part stalls it's relatively easy to spread to the rest
of the system, sometimes gradually, sometimes suddenly - e.g. if the stalled
IO was being performed while holding the mmap_sem, which isn't rare, then
anything which tries to read its proc cmdline will hang behind it.

So, we wanna avoid a situation where a non-priviledged user can cause
indefinite UNINTERRUPTIBLE sleeps to prevent local DoS attacks. I mean,
preventing local attacks is almost never fool proof but we don't want to
make it too easy at least.

Thanks.

-- 
tejun