linux-kernel - Re: [RFC][PATCH 6/6] objtool: Add IBT validation / fixups

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Message-ID: <CAFP8O3JdYoMeF75XHCWue3fYG02W_95VGCU6AN+DYPj9F75kqw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 8 Jun 2022 10:53:41 -0700
From:   Fāng-ruì Sòng <maskray@...gle.com>
To:     Peter Collingbourne <pcc@...gle.com>
Cc:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Joao Moreira <joao@...rdrivepizza.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, x86@...nel.org,
        hjl.tools@...il.com, jpoimboe@...hat.com,
        andrew.cooper3@...rix.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        ndesaulniers@...gle.com, samitolvanen@...gle.com,
        llvm@...ts.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 6/6] objtool: Add IBT validation / fixups

Hi Peter,

On Tue, Mar 1, 2022 at 7:06 PM Peter Collingbourne <pcc@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Peter,
> One issue with this call sequence is that:
>
> On Fri, Feb 11, 2022 at 02:38:03PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > caller:
> >       cmpl    $0xdeadbeef, -0x4(%rax)         # 7 bytes
>
> Because this instruction ends in the constant 0xdeadbeef, it may
> be used as a "gadget" that would effectively allow branching to an
> arbitrary address in %rax if the attacker can arrange to set ZF=1.

Do you mind elaborating how this instruction can be used as a gadget?
How does it look like?

The information will be useful to the summary of Sami's KCFI LLVM
patch: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296

> >       je      1f                              # 2 bytes
> >       ud2                                     # 2 bytes
> > 1:    call    __x86_indirect_thunk_rax        # 5 bytes
> >
> >
> >       .align 16
> >       .byte 0xef, 0xbe, 0xad, 0xde            # 4 bytes
> > func:
> >       endbr                                   # 4 bytes
> >       ...
> >       ret
>
> I think we can avoid this problem with a slight tweak to your
> instruction sequence, at the cost of 2 bytes per function prologue.
> First, change the call sequence like so:
>
>         cmpl    $0xdeadbeef, -0x6(%rax)         # 6 bytes
>         je      1f                              # 2 bytes
>         ud2                                     # 2 bytes
> 1:      call    __x86_indirect_thunk_rax        # 5 bytes
>
> The key difference is that we've changed 0x4 to 0x6.
>
> Then change the function prologue to this:
>
>         .align 16
>         .byte 0xef, 0xbe, 0xad, 0xde            # 4 bytes
>         .zero 2                                 # 2 bytes
> func:
>
> The end result of the above is that the constant embedded in the cmpl
> instruction may only be used to reach the following ud2 instruction,
> which will "harmlessly" terminate execution in the same way as if
> the prologue signature did not match.
>
> Peter
>


-- 
宋方睿